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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Symposium focuses on the developments in aggregate litigation 
since Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor1 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corporation,2 the Supreme Court’s prominent pair of mass tort class 
action cases decided in the last few years of the twentieth century.  In the 
year between those high profile decisions interpreting Federal Rule 23, 
with far less fanfare or drama, the Court approved its first significant 
amendment to the federal class action rule in over thirty years, Rule 
23(f).  This article examines the impact of that long-awaited, yet modest, 
federal rule change on its state class action rule counterparts, part of a 
larger research project examining federal/state procedural dynamics and 
broader issues of tort reform. 
Rule 23(f) grew out of the concern that lower court 
misinterpretations of Rule 23 too often escaped appellate review and 
correction due to the interlocutory nature of the class certification order.3  
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 1. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 2. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 3. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note.  The final judgment rule in 
federal courts, which generally does not permit litigants to appeal non-final orders until after a final 
judgment has been entered, created particularly risky predicaments for class litigants who believed 
Rule 23 had been wrongly applied by a district court: a rejected class plaintiff might lack sufficient 
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Rule 23(f) authorized class litigants to seek discretionary appellate 
review of such orders without all of the stringent requirements of 
preexisting exceptions to the final judgment rule.4  While states have 
their own class action rules, and are not bound by any changes to the 
federal class action rule, they face many of the same controversies about 
the proper role and parameters of the class action.  Indeed, prior to the 
adoption of Rule 23(f), a number of states already provided immediate 
access to appellate review of class certification decisions.5  The majority 
of states, however, provided limited avenues for class litigants to 
challenge certification decisions prior to Rule 23(f), particularly orders 
granting certification of a class action.6   
In the decade after Rule 23(f), a number of states altered their 
existing appellate rules relating to interlocutory review of class 
certification orders.  While the state rule changes did not always mirror 
the federal rule, they all moved in the same direction, acting to expand 
appellate access for class litigants.  It is impossible to know, of course, 
exactly why each state did so or why other states have not.  Scholars 
have examined the relationship between federal and state procedural 
rules through a variety of lenses, including the degree of uniformity, and 
how political, cultural, and judicial differences between federal and state 
courts may affect the policies and content of rulemaking.7  Building on 
that research, this Article explores two central hypotheses that may help 
explain what inspired state rulemaking bodies to amend their class action 
appeals rules. 
First, given that a majority of states have adopted civil procedural 
rules based on the model of the federal rules, I consider whether states 
might have changed their class action appeals rules in an effort to 
continue their replication of the federal model.  Second, I examine the 
                                                                                                                       
resources to pursue litigation on an individual basis, and a defendant confronting a certified class 
might feel pressured to settle rather than engage in protracted class litigation and a potentially 
crippling damages award at trial before appellate relief could be sought.  See id. 
 4. See Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action 
Certification and Interlocutory Review by United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1535–36 (2000). 
 5. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 7. See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAINS, 15–22 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice 2000); Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a 
New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure 
Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1194–1201 (2005); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 627 (1994); John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 
354 (2003); Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound 
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79 (1997). 
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role interest groups might have played in the state rulemaking processes.  
To the extent such groups perceived that rules expanding access to 
appellate courts more often work to the strategic advantage of those 
opposed to class actions, one would expect to find higher adoption rates 
of Rule 23(f) equivalent rules in states where defendant-oriented interest 
groups have incentives to influence the rulemaking process.  To test 
these two hypotheses for state rulemaking conduct, which I refer to as 
the Replica Theory and the Interest Group Theory, I consider several 
measures for each theory, attempting to determine how well these 
theories explain which states altered their class action appeals rules.   
Subject to several important limitations, I posit a few tentative 
conclusions about state rulemaking behavior post-Rule 23(f).  I found 
some clear evidence of a replica effect: following Rule 23(f), states that 
more closely patterned their rules after the federal rules (“replica states”) 
amended their rules to expand class litigant appellate access at higher 
rates than states less inclined to mirror federal rules in the first instance.  
But the high rate of expanded class appeals rules among non-replica 
states both pre- and post-Rule 23(f) clearly suggests the presence of 
significant influences other than Rule 23(f) itself. 
The data suggest that interest group pressures also likely played a 
role in some state rulemaking conduct: highly populous states, states 
with relatively large numbers of Fortune 500 corporate headquarters, and 
states with elevated levels of perceived class action activity were more 
likely to have allowed expanded class action appeals even before Rule 
23(f), and appear to have been more amenable to amending their class 
action rules post-Rule 23(f) to provide greater levels of appellate access.  
But the flexing of interest group muscles does not wholly explain state 
class action rulemaking conduct in this era, some of which remains 
apparently attributable to a Replica Theory effect. 
These conclusions, of course, are subject to a number of important 
qualifications.  Those qualifications include: first, only a relatively small 
number of states changed their class action rules.  The limited sample 
sizes involved do not permit statistical testing, so that at least some of the 
effects observed may be due to chance.  Second, I did not conduct any 
sort of regression analysis, although I do acknowledge and attempt to 
control for some confounding factors in my analysis.  The difficulty of 
controlling for confounding factors likewise counsels caution in drawing 
definitive conclusions as to the precise relationships involved.  Third, as 
noted above, this paper is only the first part of a broader and ongoing 
research project.  Thus, the conclusions I reach here necessarily are 
preliminary and provisional. 
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I begin in Part II by briefly describing the two recent federal 
procedural developments that may have played important roles in 
inspiring the state class action appellate rule changes we have witnessed 
in the last decade or so, Rule 23(f) and the Class Action Fairness Act.  
Part III presents a state-by-state analysis of the timing, nature, and 
context of each state’s decision to alter its rules to effectively expand 
opportunities for appealing class certification orders.  Finally, in Part IV, 
I examine several empirical measures in order to test the extent to which 
state rulemaking conduct may be explained by state mirroring of federal 
rules or the muscling influence of interest groups. 
II. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL RULE 23(F) AND CAFA 
A. Federal Rule 23(f) 
Federal Rule 23(f), which became effective in December of 1998, 
represented the first major amendment to the federal class action rule 
since its massive overhaul in 1966.8  Although the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules initially considered far more extensive revisions,9 the Rule 
23 revision process of the 1990s culminated with 23(f) as the only 
amendment finally adopted by the Judicial Conference and the Supreme 
Court.10  The provision, authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e),11 permits an 
aggrieved class action litigant to request that the relevant federal court of 
appeals exercise its discretion to accept an interlocutory appeal of a class 
certification order.12 
Prior to Rule 23(f), plaintiffs denied the right to proceed on a class 
basis and defendants faced with a certified class ordinarily faced slim 
prospects of interlocutory appellate review.  In 1979, the Supreme Court 
eliminated both the death knell exception to the final judgment rule and 
                                                     
 8. See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL § 
1753.1 (3d ed. (2009)). 
 9. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action 
Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 619–24 (1997) (reviewing other proposed class action rule 
amendments). 
 10. The Advisory Committee took up Rule 23 again in 2001, resulting in a number of 
amendments adopted in 2003 dealing with Rule 23(c), (d), (e) and new provisions (g) and (h). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006); see infra notes 18–40. 
 12. In its entirety, Rule 23(f) reads: 
A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class action 
certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit 
clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.  An appeal does not stay proceedings in 
the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
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the collateral order doctrine as appellate options for orders denying class 
certification.13  The remaining avenues for interlocutory appellate 
review, a writ of mandamus14 or dual certification of the order by the 
district court and court of appeals pursuant to the stringent terms of 28 
U.S.C. §1292(b),15 proved only infrequently (and unreliably) available to 
class action litigants attempting to challenge class certification decisions 
by the trial court on an interlocutory basis.16 
Rule 23(f) has a long, albeit rather low-profile back story, as a 
persistent also-ran in a wide-ranging set of procedural reforms dating 
back at least to 1986, when the ABA released its Report and 
Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action 
Improvements.17  That Report noted that “[p]revious efforts at 
meaningful reform of the class action have encountered stiff opposition 
and none has commanded the consensus necessary to achieve 
adoption.”18  Nonetheless, the ABA Committee’s five-year study 
concluded with six recommended class action reforms, the last of which 
urged Congress to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1292 to expressly provide federal  
 
                                                     
 13. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469, 476 (1978).  The death knell exception 
persisted, however, in several states that declined to follow the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Coopers.  See, e.g., Perry v. Cullipher, 318 S.E.2d 354, 355–56 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Alessandro v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 409 A.2d 347, 350–51 (Pa. 1979); Mitchem v. Melton, 277 S.E.2d 
895, 901 (W. Va. 1981). 
 14. See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1090 (6th Cir. 1996) (granting writ of 
mandamus to review certification of class certification order); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 
F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(same). 
 15. Section 1292(b) not only requires litigants to seek permission to file an interlocutory appeal 
from both the district court and the trial court, it also demands determinations that the order 
“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate 
termination of the litigation.”  28 U.S.C. §1292(b) (2006); see, e.g., Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, 
Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.1996) (agreeing to hear interlocutory appeal of class certification order 
certified by district court pursuant to § 1292(b)); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3rd Cir. 
1986) (same). 
 16. See Solimine & Hines, supra note 4, at 1535–36 (before Rule 23(f), it was “extremely 
difficult for litigants to gain an immediate appeal of a class certification order”); Thomas E. 
Willging, Laural L. Hooper, & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the 
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 167 (1996) (observing that, with few exceptions, 
class certification orders rarely qualified for either § 1292(b) or a successful writ of mandamus).  See 
generally Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining 
Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 555–59 (2002) (summarizing and 
identifying inadequacies of the exceptions to the final judgment rule in the mass tort context). 
 17. Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Litig., Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on 
Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195 (1986) [hereinafter ABA Report].  The Special 
Committee, made up of attorneys with class action and public interest perspectives as well as two 
federal judges, began its deliberations in 1981.  Id. at 196. 
 18. Id. at 196–97. 
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appellate courts with the unilateral discretionary authority to hear appeals 
from both grants and denials of class certification motions.19 
The ABA Committee’s suggested amendment to §1292 not only 
closely resembles the ultimate language of Rule 23(f), which became 
effective twelve years later,20 but its reasoning and contemplated goals 
for the expansion of available interlocutory appellate authority 
foreshadow Rule 23(f)’s Advisory Committee’s Note.21  Describing the 
“unique public importance” of this “critical ruling” in class action 
lawsuits, the ABA Committee explained that immediate discretionary 
appeal of class certification orders would help to address the appellate 
dilemmas presented to both a rejected class representative and a 
defendant confronting a certified class.  The defeated individual plaintiff 
“must abandon his efforts to represent the alleged class or incur expenses 
wholly disproportionate to his individual recovery in order to secure 
appellate review of the certification order,”22 while a defendant faces 
“potentially ruinous liability and may be forced to settle a case rather 
than run the economic risk of trial in order to secure review of the 
certification ruling.”23  In either event, erroneous class certification 
rulings may effectively escape appellate review.  The Committee’s 
recommended amendment to Section 1292, therefore, would create a 
new provision expressly permitting class litigants to apply directly to the 
court of appeals for discretionary review of certification orders. 
The idea of amending Section 1292 to expand appellate authority 
over interlocutory orders, although not directed specifically at class 
certification orders, was also included in the wide-ranging, one hundred 
and eighty-eight page report released by the Federal Courts Study 
Committee (“FCSC”) in 1990.24  The “little noticed and seemingly 
                                                     
 19. Id. at 210–11.  The ABA Committee also recommended consolidating all of Rule 23(b)’s 
provisions into a single standard applicable to all class actions, modifying the notice and exclusion 
requirements of Rule 23(c)(2), clarifying the interaction between class certification motions and 
dispositive motions under Rules 12 and 56, and adopting amendments designed to facilitate early 
judicial management and coordination of class actions.  See id. at 198–210. 
 20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).  The ABA Committee’s proposal included, for example, a ten-day 
time period for appeals from district court certification orders and a provision that “an appeal 
hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district court or the Court of 
Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.”  ABA Report, supra note 17, at 210. 
 21. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note with ABA Report, supra note 17, 
at 210–11.  The ABA Committee concluded with a familiar anticipation that appellate courts would 
“rare[ly]” accept review of such orders, but the “potential for immediate interlocutory review will 
encourage compliance with the certification procedure and will afford an opportunity for the prompt 
correction of error with resulting litigation economies.”  ABA Report, supra note 17, at 211. 
 22. ABA Report, supra note 17, at 210. 
 23. Id. at 211; see also Willging, Hooper, & Niemic, supra note 16, at 174. 
 24. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
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innocuous”25 appellate procedure recommendations by the FCSC sought 
to provide the Supreme Court the rulemaking authority to “add to—but 
not subtract from—the list of categories of interlocutory appeal.”26  In 
1992, Congress implemented that recommendation, along with a host of 
higher profile FCSC provisions, amending Section 1292 to authorize 
rule-based interlocutory appeals.27  As one scholar observed, the appeals 
provisions “were treated as noncontroversial by Congress.”28  The 
amendment laid the foundation for the only exercise of this new 
rulemaking authority thus far, Rule 23(f). 
In 1991, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, at the request of 
the Judicial Conference, embarked on what would become a seven-year 
odyssey of Rule 23 rulemaking, considering a number of provocative and 
innovative amendments to the class action rule.29  From the very 
beginning of this process, “the Advisory Committee recognized the need 
to provide some means of interlocutory review of class certification 
orders,”30 and every proposal the Committee considered throughout the 
1990s contained a provision roughly approximating the ultimately 
adopted final version of Rule 23(f).31  Indeed, after much debate and 
deliberation, the more far-reaching and ambitious proposals were 
“withdrawn or shelved,”32 while Rule 23(f) emerged as the sole 
successful class action amendment. 
Although it may have lacked the drama of other contemporary class 
action proposals, Rule 23(f) nonetheless faced “a strident and sizeable” 
opposition among those who contributed to the public debate during its 
                                                                                                                       
COMMITTEE 95–96 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 25. See Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right 
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 718 (1992). 
 26. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 24, at 96. 
 27. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat. 
4506, 4506 (1992) (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (1994)). 
 28. See Martineau, supra note 25, at 726. 
 29. See generally Mullenix, supra note 9; Willging, Hooper, & Niemic, supra note 16. 
 30. Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f), a Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. 
REV. 97, 102 (2001); see also Blair v. Equifax Check Serv., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 833–34 (7th Cir. 
1999) (“We keep in mind the reasons Rule 23(f) came into being. . . .  By the end of the case it will 
be too late—if indeed the case has an ending that is subject to appellate review.”). 
 31. Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to the Hon. 
Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Re: Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 2–3 (May 21, 1997) [hereinafter Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules] (on file with author) (“This interlocutory appeal provision has persisted 
virtually unchanged through the many alternative Rule 23 drafts that have been prepared by the 
Advisory Committee over the last six years.”); Solimine & Hines, supra note 4, at 1564. 
 32. See Solimine & Hines, supra note 4, at 1564; see also Mullenix, supra note 30, at 102–03 
(describing the history of Rule 23(f)). 
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notice and comment period.33  Objectors contended, inter alia, that the 
seemingly non-partisan rule would in practice benefit defendants more 
than plaintiffs.34  For example, the Advisory Committee summarized one 
commenter as declaring that “[o]verwhelmingly plaintiffs oppose and 
defendants support.  This is clear proof that this proposal favors 
defendants.”35  As another objector argued, “the rule as written does little 
to advance a plaintiff’s situation, but does provide significant dilatory 
opportunities for defendants.”36 
In 1997, the Advisory Committee approved Rule 23(f), however, 
with the federal judiciary’s firmly stated confidence that appellate courts 
would exercise their new authority promptly and with due care to prevent 
abuses of the provision.37  After winding its way successfully through the 
Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court,38 
                                                     
 33. Mullenix, supra note 30, at 104; see also id. at 103 (observing that “proposed Rule 23(f) 
generated more opposition than support”).  Although the proposal’s supporters welcomed the 
increased opportunity to seek interlocutory appeals, many urged the committee to delete proposed 
language in the Advisory Committee’s Note suggesting that appeals should be granted “with 
restraint,” and also recommended that the rule include an automatic stay provision.  See, e.g., FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(f) app. B (summary of comments by Lewis H. Goldfarb and Sheila L. Birnbaum).  
While the Advisory Committee rejected the automatic stay suggestion, it did eliminate the “restraint” 
reference in its final Note.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note (“Permission to 
appeal may be granted or denied on the basis of any consideration that the court of appeals finds 
persuasive.”). 
 34. See Solimine & Hines, supra note 4, at 1565 (“[O]pponents of the proposed rule argued that 
defendants would abuse it and plaintiffs would rarely use it.”). 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) app. B (summary of comments by Richard A. Koffman); see also 
Mullenix, supra note 30, at 104 (“Almost all of the critical commentary regarding proposed Rule 
23(f) emanated from the plaintiffs’ bar.”). 
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) app. B (summary of comments by Stephen Gardner); see also Report 
of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 31, at 4 (“The main ground of opposition is 
that applications for permission to appeal will become a routine strategy for increasing cost and 
delay.”).  In a 2001 report, the Advisory Committee appears to describe Rule 23(f) in retrospect as a 
response more to the lack of interlocutory appellate opportunities for defendants than to wrongly 
denied plaintiffs: 
Advocates for reform advised the Committee that in many cases the certification decision 
was dispositive of the litigation; once a class is certified and the stakes of the litigation 
are magnified, whatever the merits of the claim, the defendant may conclude there is little 
choice but to bow to the overwhelming pressure to settle.  To address this problem and to 
foster the growth of appellate law, the Committee proposed Rule 23(f) . . . . 
Memorandum from David F. Levi, Chair, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to the Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, at 25 (July 31, 2001) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2002/8-
01CV.pdf. 
 37. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, supra note 31, at 4. 
 38. See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 164–
65 (1991) (describing the “extended periods of deliberation” of the judicial rulemaking process).  
Indeed, even as Rule 23(f) was approaching final implementation in 1998, some members of 
Congress—apparently impatient with the lengthy rulemaking process—introduced statutory versions 
of Rule 23(f).  See Judicial Improvement Act of 1998, S. 2163, 105th Cong. (1998); Richard L. 
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Rule 23(f) finally became effective on December 1, 1998.  The rule now 
seems to enjoy a happy (if dull) reputation as a paragon of sound 
rulemaking, plugging a sorely-needed gap in appellate oversight and 
fostering the development of a body of appellate jurisprudence on 
important class action issues.39 
Recent empirical studies of the implementation of Rule 23(f), 
however, suggest that plaintiff objectors (and defendant supporters) may 
have assessed rather accurately the disparate impact the seemingly 
neutral appellate authority might have.40  While the likelihood of plaintiff 
utilization of the appellate opportunity may have been understated,41 
studies of the actual workings of Rule 23(f) provide support for the 
proposition that defendants would seek interlocutory appeal of 
certification orders more frequently than plaintiffs.  The preliminary data 
also suggests defendants are more likely than plaintiffs to succeed in 
those appeals.42 
In an invaluable empirical analysis of docketed Rule 23(f) petitions 
in the federal circuit courts of appeals, Barry Sullivan and Amy Kobelski 
Trueblood documented what they described as a “staggering volume of 
                                                                                                                       
Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 928–29 (2002) (bemoaning this 
proposed legislation and the “increased willingness of Congress to take action on matters that are, or 
might appropriately be, the subject of rulemaking”). 
 39. Mullenix, supra note 30, at 100, 110 (“Rule 23(f) has been a relatively successful rule,” 
although “something of a yawn.”); Waters, supra note 16, at 587 (“Rule 23(f) proved surprisingly 
uncontroversial from the beginning, generally receiving the approval of scholars and practitioners 
alike.”).  Indeed, a class action plaintiffs’ advocate approvingly described Rule 23(f) as one of the 
“nonpartisan, functional additions and refinements to Rule 23.”  Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class 
Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1476 (2005); see also Richard A. Nagareda, 
Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 170–71 (2009) (contrasting 
CAFA’s defendant-favoring removal provisions with Rule 23(f), which “remains available in an 
evenhanded fashion to whichever side is dissatisfied with the district court’s class certification 
ruling”). 
 40. See Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f): A Note on Law and Discretion 
in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 283–88 (2008); Richard D. Freer, Interlocutory Review of 
Class Action Certification Decisions: A Preliminary Empirical Study of Federal and State 
Experience, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 13, 18–22 (2007) (analysis based solely on published Rule 23(f) 
decisions). 
 41. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (prediction that plaintiffs would never or “rarely” 
seek appeal). 
 42. See Sullivan & Trueblood, supra note 40; cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ From Negotiable Instruments, 
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947.  Professors Clermont and Eisenberg conducted an empirical study of the 
differences between defendant and plaintiff success rates on appeal, and found that “a defendants’ 
advantage exists, accompanying the general tendency of appellate courts to affirm.”  Id. at 971.  The 
authors explain that the defendant advantage on appeal is likely due to “appellate judges’ 
misperceptions  . . . of the trial courts’ being pro-plaintiff,” and conclude that “[i]n the end, the 
appellate playing field still appears unlevel.”  Id. at 949. 
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filed Rule 23(f) petitions” in the first eight years of the rule’s existence.43  
Of the 558 petitions filed during that time, 198 were filed by plaintiffs 
while 278 were filed by defendants.44  The rates of petitions and grants 
varied from circuit to circuit, but “[i]n most circuits, our data suggest that 
defendants’ petitions are granted more often.”45  Moreover, this study 
found that of the 126 Rule 23(f) appeals that were actually decided by 
the courts of appeals during this time frame, defendants won reversal of 
class certification orders in 67 of 95 cases.46 
This study, then, suggests a strong incentive for defendants opposed 
to class certification to pursue interlocutory appeals, at least in the 
federal courts.  Whether this federal appellate trend favoring class action 
defendants holds true among state appellate courts remains to be seen.47  
Certainly the strategic advantages of class certification interlocutory 
appeals have not been lost on defendants, nor on corporate lobbying 
organizations that consistently include it on their class action reform 
                                                     
 43. See Sullivan & Trueblood, supra note 40, at 283. 
 44. Id. at 290 tbl. 1. 
 45. Id. at 286.  Overall, the appellate courts granted plaintiff petitions only 22% of the time, 
compared to defendant petitions, which were granted 45% of the time.  Id. at 290 tbl. 1.  In a 2005 
panel discussion at a workshop co-sponsored by the Federal Trade Commission and The 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Judge Diane Wood of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit identified both the death knell and the pressure to settle as potential grounds for 
finding that the certification decision “really is, in effect, the whole case” and thus deserving of 
appellate scrutiny pursuant to Rule 23(f).  See Protecting Consumer Interests in Class Actions, Panel 
2: Tools for Ensuring that Settlements Are “Fair, Reasonable and Adequate”, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1197, 1213 (2005).  But Judge Wood also acknowledged that “if somebody has erroneously 
denied class certification there is only one person whose rights are going to be affected by that . . . .  
There’s self-correction built into the system because someone else is probably out there with the 
same class action” and that person would not be precluded by the decision rejecting class 
certification by a prior would-be class representative’s rejection.  Id. at 1212. 
 46. Sullivan & Trueblood, supra note 40, at 291 tbl. 3.  The study also found that defendants 
succeeded in twenty-two of thirty-one appeals by plaintiffs challenging the denial of class 
certification.  Id. 
 47. See Freer, supra note 40, at 27 (examining published interlocutory appeals in both state and 
federal courts and concluding that the “single most likely outcome of interlocutory review in the 
federal and state cases is a reversal of certification”); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS; 
OFFICE OF COURT RESEARCH, CLASS CERTIFICATION IN CALIFORNIA: SECOND INTERIM REPORT 
FROM THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 13 (2010) (noting that only one case 
in the study database included interlocutory review of certified class, but that case did result in a writ 
of mandamus setting aside class certification); cf. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1500 (2008) 
(noting that in contrast to the Federal Judicial Center’s detailed empirical studies of federal class 
actions, he is “aware of no reliable data, historical or current, concerning state court class actions, 
and I doubt that reliable data exists for most states”); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The 
Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and 
Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1763 (2008) (observing that the “lack of state court data on 
class actions stems from multiple sources, including the lack of necessary resources to collect the 
data in the state systems and the lack of common computerized case management systems”). 
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wish lists.48  And the perception (at least) of a partisan effect of this 
seemingly nonpartisan appellate rule may go a long way toward 
explaining the expansion of interlocutory appellate opportunities in state 
court systems in the wake of Rule 23(f).49  Before turning to that state 
experience and possible explanatory hypotheses, however, one other 
critical aspect of recent federal class action law must be addressed, the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. 
B. The Class Action Fairness Act 
The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), like Rule 23(f), emerged 
after several years of repeated consideration and deliberation50 beginning 
with a related bill introduced in 1998.51  Persistent congressional interest 
in class action reform can be evidenced not only in CAFA’s multiple 
predecessor bills, but in Congress’s successful 1995 effort to reform 
securities class action practices.52 
CAFA altered the federal diversity jurisdiction statute to enable 
federal courts to hear most class actions involving minimally diverse 
parties in actions involving over 100 plaintiffs and over $5 million.53  
                                                     
 48. See e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 101 WAYS TO IMPROVE STATE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS: A USER’S GUIDE TO PROMOTING FAIR AND EFFECTIVE CIVIL JUSTICE, 20 (2009) 
available at http:w.instituteforlegalreform.com/images/stories/documents/pdf/research/101waysto 
improvestatelegalsystems.pdf (listing first among five proposed class action reforms: “Provide for 
interlocutory appeal of the grant or denial of class certification.”).  Similarly, the American 
Legislative Exchange Council, a non-profit organization of state legislators promoting conservative 
policy approaches, promulgated model legislation listing the provision of discretionary appellate 
review of class certification orders as one of “five changes that states could adopt in an effort to 
achieve modest (but significant) improvements to their statutes and/or court rules governing class 
actions.”  AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, CLASS ACTION IMPROVEMENTS ACT 
(2000). 
 49. See infra Figure 1. 
 50. See Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80 
TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1593–97 (2006) (describing CAFA’s legislative history); see also Burbank, 
supra note 47, at 1441 (noting that CAFA “resulted from years of intense lobbying (on both sides of 
the aisle by interest groups associated with both plaintiffs and defendants), partisan wrangling, and, 
following two successful filibusters, fragile compromises”). 
 51. See Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998, H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998); Class Action 
Fairness Act of 1998, S. 2083, 105th Cong. (1998). 
 52. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  See generally Michael A. Perino, Fraud and 
Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 
288–98 (1998) (describing legislative history of securities class action reform statute); Joel 
Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1996). 
 53. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(d)(5)–(6), 119 Stat. 4 (2005) 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  See generally Sherman, supra note 50.  Professor 
Sherman described CAFA as “the most significant change in class action practice since the federal 
class action rule (Rule 23) was amended in 1966.”  Id. at 1593. 
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The Act’s preamble points to Congress’s view that state court class 
action abuses necessitated the federalization of a broad swath of class 
actions in state courts.54  While those assertions have been roundly 
criticized as largely anecdotal or misleading,55 and CAFA itself has been 
the subject of much withering academic criticism,56 Congress’s stated 
motivations reveal a popular perception of state courts as rogue and 
unreliable guardians against the most insidious class action practices. 
Yet by its own terms, CAFA does not apply to all state court class 
actions, and while state class actions post-CAFA have undoubtedly 
declined,57 they are far from extinct.58  Plaintiffs’ attorneys resolved to 
                                                     
 54. The preamble reads: 
Abuses in class actions undermine the national judicial system, the free flow of interstate 
commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the 
United States Constitution, in that State and local courts are – 
(A) keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court; 
(B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants; and 
(C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States and bind the 
rights of the residents of those States. 
Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), 119 Stat. 4, 5. 
 55. See, e.g., Cabraser, supra note 39, at 1516–17 (CAFA “‘is based more on misperception 
than truth’” regarding allegedly “plaintiff-friendly” state courts “rife with class action abuses.”) 
(quoting Marcia Coyle, A Reform’s Fate Rests in Federal Courts; Delays, Larger Classes to Come 
in Class Action Reform, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 14, 2005, at 1, 1)).  Indeed, the National Conference of 
State Legislatures, the Conference of Chief Justices of the State Courts, and a coalition of fourteen 
state attorneys general all submitted letters in opposition to CAFA protesting the lack of empirical 
support for such findings.  See Letter from Sen. Michael Balboni, Chair, Nat’l Conference of State 
Legislatures Law and Criminal Justice Comm., to U.S. Senate 1 (Feb. 2, 2005), http://www.citizen 
.org/documents/NCSLClassActionLetter2-05.pdf (urging that there is no evidence that “states have 
broadly overreached or are unable to address the problems themselves”); Letter from Annice M. 
Wagner, President, Conference of Chief Justices, to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary (Mar. 28, 2002), http://www.citizen.org/documents/CCJLetter.pdf (pointing out the 
absence of “hard evidence of the inability of the state judicial systems to hear and decide fairly class 
actions brought in state courts”); Letter from Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New 
York et al., to Hon. Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, and Hon. Harry Reid, Minority Leader, 
U.S. Senate (Feb. 7, 2005), in 151 CONG. REC. H644–45 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2005) (“There is no 
compelling need or empirical support for such a sweeping change in our long-established system for 
adjudicating state law issues.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old 
and the New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1887 (2008) (“CAFA did 
not so much save defendants from biased state courts as reward them with access to an alternate 
forum that they regarded as more favorable to their interests.”); Burbank, supra note 47, at 1542 
(“At the end of the day, CAFA’s exceedingly narrow exceptions are revealed as another depressing 
example of legislative overreaching by those who invoke the virtues of federalism when it is 
convenient to do so.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler, The Other Side of the CAFA Effect: An Empirical Analysis of 
Class Action Activity in the Oklahoma State Courts, 58 KAN. L. REV. 809, 825–27 (2010) (finding “a 
significant reduction in class action filings in the Oklahoma state courts post-CAFA”). 
 58. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1765, 1789 n.117 (2008) (pointing out that the number of class actions filed in California state 
courts in 2005 may have been down from pre-CAFA highs, but was “still higher than in 2003, which 
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remain in state court,59 for example, may seek to avoid CAFA removal 
by limiting the total amount of class damages to less than CAFA’s $5 
million threshold.60  They may also consolidate plaintiffs in plausible 
units of less than 100 persons61 or sue a home-state defendant on behalf 
of a class of largely in-state plaintiffs.62  The threat of the latter option 
likely leads most Fortune 500 corporations to be acutely cognizant of 
state court class action rules (and appellate practices) in their home 
states.63  And CAFA merely permits, it does not require, the removal of 
class actions filed in state courts, which could provide an attractive state 
court forum for seeking approval of a settlement class that might not pass  
 
                                                                                                                       
was higher than 2002”); Gregory C. Cook, The Alabama Class Action: Does it Exist Any Longer?  
And Does it Matter?, 66 ALA. LAW. 289, 294 (2005) (asserting that post-CAFA, the “Alabama class 
action is not dead—but it has been properly limited to those cases affecting Alabama and limited to 
those claims and cases that Alabama circuit courts have the time and resources to manage”). 
 59. See Roger K. Smith, Keeping Your State Court Class Action in State Court, LITIG. NEWS, 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/practice_areas/classaction-state-court-CAFA.html 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (advising post-CAFA plaintiffs that “if you are careful in your definition 
of the proposed class, careful in the amount you request on behalf of your clients, and careful in how 
you plan to try your clients’ claims, then you can keep your state court class action in state court”). 
 60. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act 
on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 
1734–35 (2008) (in light of a “2003 FJC survey of attorneys in recently terminated class actions . . . 
finding that the median recovery in class action settlements was $800,000 and that 75% of the 
settlements were valued at less than $5.2 million,” and “the $5 million CAFA limit might exclude a 
substantial majority of class actions, depending on the relationship between the amount in 
controversy and the final settlement amount”) (citing Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, 
Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 591, 650 (2006)); W. Pitts Carr, Class Litigation, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 
16, 2006 (Ga.) (“Smaller cases may still find repose in state court [post-CAFA], but you are going to 
have to plead smart to make it stick.”). 
 61. See generally Tanoh v. Dow Chemical Co., 561 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming federal 
district court remand of seven groups of less than 100 plaintiffs, finding CAFA’s mass action 
removal provisions inapplicable).  But see Lee & Willging, supra note 54, at 1735 (noting that the 
2003 FJC class action survey “found that the median size of class actions removed to federal courts 
and retained in the face of a motion to remand was 1000 members,” suggesting “that the 100-class 
member restriction will have limited effect” on CAFA’s jurisdictional reach). 
 62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (2006) (federal court shall decline jurisdiction where “two-
thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary 
defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed”); Georgene Vairo, 
Foreword: Complex Litigation in California and Beyond, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 763, 769–70 (2008) 
(“If plaintiffs believe that it is more likely that a class will be certified under California’s rules, they 
ought to consider proposing a class that consists mainly of California citizens.  With such a proposed 
class, if a [California-based defendant] removes the case under CAFA, it will be returned to 
California state court under CAFA’s mandatory remand provision . . . .”).  But see Sherman, supra 
note 50, at 1597 (suggesting that in light of the limits of CAFA’s jurisdictional exceptions, “it seems 
unlikely that many class actions can be crafted by class action attorneys to stay in state courts”). 
 63. See infra Part III; see also Gregory C. Cook & Jennifer H. Clark, Strategy Decisions On 
CAFA: The Defense Perspective, 19 PRAC. LITIG. 17, 18 (2008) (noting that “state appellate courts 
can sometimes be more favorable” for defendants, specifically those states with “statutes providing 
appeals of class certification as a matter of right—something not available in federal court”). 
0 6 2_HINES FINAL.DOC 5/27/2010  9:26:06 AM 
1040 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
muster under “the exacting federal court settlement-approval 
standards.”64 
In a previous version of CAFA, members of Congress sought to 
change Rule 23(f) itself.  Section 6 of the House version of the “Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2003” proposed to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) to 
include an immediate right of appeal for class action litigants challenging 
class certification orders, as well as an automatic stay of lower court 
proceedings during the pendency of the appeal.65  This statutory attempt 
to alter Rule 23(f)’s balance of discretionary appellate review coupled 
with a default rule allowing proceedings to continue during the pendency 
of any appeal was the subject of a stern letter written by Judge Anthony 
J. Scirica, the Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, to the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee.66 
Urging the immediate withdrawal of the class action appeal 
provisions of the bill, Judge Scirica contended that they would “directly 
conflict[] with Rule 23(f)” in a manner “inconsistent with the Rules 
Enabling Act rulemaking process.”67  Judge Scirica pointedly explained 
that Rule 23(f) had been “promulgated as a result of an exhaustive study 
of class action practices,” and was believed to be “working well” as 
presently constructed.68  Providing a right to interlocutory appeal, on the 
other hand, “might tempt a party to file an interlocutory appeal solely for 
tactical reasons,” while an automatic stay “could disrupt the district 
court’s ability to manage the case.”69  Judge Scirica was apparently 
persuasive, as subsequent versions of CAFA, including the one enacted 
in 2005, did not include the proposed class action appellate provisions.70 
                                                     
 64. Marcus, supra note 58, at 1799; see also Cook & Clark, supra note 63, at 17–18 (urging 
defendants seeking quick settlements of class actions to stay in state courts that “tend to be 
somewhat less strict in their evaluation of settlement agreements, a plus for defendants”). 
 65. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. § 6 (2003). 
 66. Letter from Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chair, 
Committee on the Judiciary, United State House of Representatives (May 12, 2003) (on file with 
author). 
 67. Id. at 1. 
 68. Id. at 2. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2004, S. 12, 108th Cong. (2004). 
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III. THE STATE EXPERIENCE: CHANGES IN CLASS ACTION 
INTERLOCUTORY APPELLATE RULES POST-FRCP 23(F) 
A. Overview 
In the decade after Rule 23(f), as can be seen in Figure 1, a sizeable 
number of states altered existing appellate rules relating to interlocutory 
review of class certification orders.  I refer to all such states in this article 
as “amending” states, although the form of the amendment varies among 
the states: from judicial rulemaking to legislative rulemaking; from 
amendments directly to the state’s class action rule to amendments to its 
rules of appellate procedure; from amendments authorizing discretionary 
appeals to amendments authorizing appeals as of right. 
Even before Rule 23(f), a number of states allowed, by rule or 
statute, interlocutory appeals of class certification orders as of right71 or 
by discretion of the state appellate courts.72  Another set of states 
                                                     
 71. See ARK. R. APP. P. 2(a)(9); IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.264(3); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(vi), 
9.130(a)(6); N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 993(A)(6) (Supp. 2010); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(3) (Vernon 2008).  States allowing appeals as of right for 
both grants and denials of class certification predominantly do so through rules or statutes 
specifically limited to class actions.  See sources cited supra.  But see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5701 
(McKinney Supp. 2010); Adam Feit, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in 
Class Actions and Complex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 899, 908 (2008) (“Unlike the federal system and most other states, New York gives parties the 
right to appeal almost any civil interlocutory order.”). 
 72. See, e.g., DEL. R. S. CT. 42; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 118 (West 2000); MICH. 
CT. R. 7.302; MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 105.01; N.J. COURT RULE 2:2-4. 
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restricted appeals as of right only to plaintiffs denied the right to proceed 
on a class basis,73 rejecting (explicitly or implicitly) the Supreme Court’s 
views in Cooper on the finality of such orders.74  The majority of states, 
however, limited interlocutory appeals of class certification orders, 
particularly orders granting class certification, in much the same manner 
as the federal courts did prior to the promulgation of Rule 23(f).  They 
imposed stringent appellate criteria, required trial court approval,75 or 
permitted such orders only to be reviewed by grant of extraordinary 
writ.76 
                                                     
 73. See, e.g., State ex rel. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 490 P.2d 351, 351–52 (Mont. 1971) (“It 
should be noted that [former MONT. R. APP. R. 1(b)(2)] provides for an appeal from an order 
refusing to permit an action to be maintained as a class action.”); Butler v. Audio/Video Affiliates, 
Inc., 611 So. 2d 330 (Ala. 1992); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967); Johnson v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 515 P.2d 68 (Nev. 1973); Alessandro v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 409 A.2d 
347 (Pa. 1979).  While one of the states in this category also allowed discretionary appeals by 
defendants, see PA. R. APP. P. 312, the other eight states required defendants faced with a certified 
class to seek extraordinary review by writ.  See, e.g., Ex parte AmSouth Bancorp., 717 So. 2d 357, 
361 (Ala. 1998); Meyer v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 885 P.2d 622 (Nev. 1994); Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 755 (Cal. 1976).  One is hard-pressed to find much evidence of 
successful writ petitions in most of these states, but the appellate courts of Alabama and California 
seem to have been somewhat more liberal in their approach.  See Glenn A. Danas, The Interstate 
Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999: Another Congressional Attempt to Federalize State Law, 49 
EMORY L. J. 1305, 1325 n.122 (2000) (Alabama “traditionally allowed for frequent class 
certification review via writs of mandamus”); Freer, supra note 40, at 26 (noting that in California 
state courts, “the writ of mandate is used more generally than in federal practice”). 
 74. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); see also supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
 75. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 19.225 (2003); Levine v. Empire Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 557 P.2d 
386, 387 (Colo. 1976); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cantrell, 399 S.E.2d 237, 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); 
Petruchius v. Don Roth Rests., Inc., 398 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (Ill. 1979). 
 76. See, e.g., Philip Morris Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 216–18 (Md. 2000) (granting writ 
of mandamus but emphasizing that “[i]t will be the rare case indeed which justifies the issuance of 
interlocutory mandamus relief”); State ex rel. Byrd v. Chadwick, 956 S.W.2d 369, 376 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1997); Millett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 760 A.2d 250 (Me. 2000); Lake v. Piper, Jaffray & 
Hopwood, Inc., 324 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Neb. 1982); Knowles v. Standard Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 261 
S.E.2d 49 (S.C. 1979).  But see Garrard County Bd. of Educ. v. Jackson, 12 S.W.3d 686, 689 (Ky. 
2000) (holding that a class certification orders are not even “a proper subject for relief in the form of 
a writ of mandamus”). 
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As Table 1 demonstrates, the lion’s share of changes in the wake of 
Rule 23(f) occurred among those states that previously had imposed 
limits on immediate appeals of class certification orders, as might have 
been expected.  Of the forty-nine jurisdictions authorizing class actions,77 
twenty-three states and the District of Columbia limited or rarely 
permitted interlocutory appeals of class certification orders prior to 
1998.78  Another eight states allowed plaintiffs to appeal the denial of 
class certification but required defendants challenging a certified class to 
seek extraordinary appellate review.79  Thirteen out of these thirty-two 
states, or forty percent, expanded opportunities for immediate appellate 
review, either by providing permission to seek discretionary review of 
class certification decisions directly from appellate courts, paralleling 
Federal Rule 23(f), or by allowing appellate review as of right for all 
class litigants.80  Conversely, only two of the seventeen states (or twelve  
 
                                                     
 77. Neither Mississippi nor Virginia authorizes general class actions.  See Thomas D. Rowe, 
Jr., State and Foreign Class Actions Rules and Statutes: Differences From—and Lessons for?—
Federal Rule 23, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 147, 148–49 (2007) (describing Mississippi’s “liberal use of 
non-class permissive-party joinder” and Virginia’s limited treatment of class actions and multi-
claimant litigation). 
 78. See supra Table 1. 
 79. See id.; see also supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra Table 1. 
Table 1:  Pre-Rule 23(f) Availability of Interlocutory Appeal 
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percent) that previously had allowed for class action appeals as of right 
or by discretion amended their class action appellate rules after 1998.81 
It is notable, however, that all of the changes resulted either in an 
expansion or a codification of existing appellate rights rather than a 
restriction of appellate rights.  In other words, none of the states that 
previously permitted interlocutory appeals as of right tracked the federal 
rule by limiting such appeals to the discretion of the appellate courts.  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Coopers, however, two states 
did exactly that, interpreting their final judgment rules post-Coopers to 
no longer allow appeals as of right from certification orders.82 
Figures 2 and 3 together paint a fairly striking illustration of the 
impact of these state class action appellate rule changes.83  Figure 2 
presents the thirty-five percent of states prior to Rule 23(f) that provided 
expanded appellate access for class litigants, and the sixty-five percent of 
states that limited such appeals.  Figure 3 shows the same status today, 
with the numbers virtually flipped: adding the amending states to the 
states with preexisting appellate rights, fully sixty-one percent of states 
now provide expanded appellate opportunities for class litigants while 
only thirty-nine percent do not. 
 
 
                                                     
 81. See id.  Minnesota and Louisiana fall into this category, codifying what appears to have 
been their preexisting appellate practices.  Minnesota’s appellate courts already provided an 
opportunity for class litigants to seek direct discretionary review.  See infra notes 142–43 and 
accompanying text.  In Louisiana, the amending statute purported to codify prior judicial 
interpretations of the applicability of a generic appeals statute.  See infra notes 144–46 and 
accompanying text. 
 82. See Smith v. Tobin, 311 N.W.2d 209, 211 (S.D. 1981) (overruling Rollinger v. J. C. Penney 
Co., 192 N.W.2d 699 (S.D. 1971)); Hanania v. City of Tucson, 597 P.2d 190, 191–92 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1979) (overruling Home Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Pleasants, 534 P.2d 275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1975)).  Several other states simply followed the Supreme Court’s restrictive reasoning in Coopers.  
See, e.g., Petruchius v. Don Roth Rest., Inc., 398 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Snowden 
v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 479 A.2d 1329, 1332–35 (Md. 1984); Ralph v. American Family Mut. 
Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991); Bayberry Assoc. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 
557–58 (Tenn. 1990). 
 83. These state-by-state snapshots reflect the availability of class appeals as of July 1, 1998 
(Figure 2) and July 1, 2009 (Figure 3). 
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B. State-by-State Chronology 
Ohio, the first amending state in this era,84 had a rather complicated 
class action appeals story.85  Well before Coopers, Ohio recognized the 
“death knell” exception for denials of class certification pursuant to its 
“final order” statute.86  In 1981, and again in 1990, the Ohio Supreme 
Court further interpreted that statute to include orders granting class 
certification.87  In 1993, however, Ohio’s high court overruled this 
second line of cases88 and, in 1998, reaffirmed that orders approving 
class certification were interlocutory and not appealable as of right under 
the final order statute.89 
In 1998, the Ohio General Assembly amended that statute to add two 
new distinct categories of appealable final orders, making clear that the 
statute should indeed apply to orders determining whether “an action 
may or may not be maintained as a class action.”90  As originally 
introduced in 1997, the bill sought only to add provisional remedies to 
the statute, but in the spring of 1998, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
added the provision extending “final order” status to class certification  
 
                                                     
 84. Ohio is included even though its General Assembly actually amended the relevant 
interlocutory appeals statute to include class action decisions effective July 22, 1998, just over four 
months before FRCP 23(f) went into effect.  Ohio’s amendment occurred well after the Judicial 
Conference of the United States approved Rule 23(f) in 1997, and the United States Supreme Court 
gave the rule its final approval in early 1998.  See generally Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States (September 23, 1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov 
/judconf/proceedings/1997-09.pdf; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8 (noting the Supreme Court’s 
approval of Rule 23(f) on April 24, 1998). 
 85. See Gary L. Garrison, Appellate Jurisdiction in Ohio Over Final Appealable Orders, 50 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 595, 635–37 (2002). 
 86. See Roemisch v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. 314 N.E.2d 386, 387–89 (1974); see also OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02 (defining “final order” appealable as of right to include “[a]n order that 
affects a substantial right in an action which in effect determines the action and prevents a 
judgment”). 
 87. See Dayton Women’s Health Ctr. v. Enix, 555 N.E.2d 956, 958 (Ohio 1990); Amato v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 423 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Ohio 1981). 
 88. See Polikoff v. Adam, 616 N.E.2d 213, 218 (Ohio 1993). 
 89. See Chamberlain v. AK Steel Corp., 696 N.E.2d 569, 569 (Ohio 1998).  Justice Lundberg 
Stratton dissented in Chamberlain, noting that the amended final order statute expressly allowing 
appeals of class certification orders, admittedly not yet in effect at the time the case was submitted to 
the Court, nevertheless merely “clarifies the public policy that both the granting and denial of class 
certification are appealable.”  Id. at 571 (Lundberg Stratton, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 90. See H.R. 394, 122nd Gen. Assem. (Ohio 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02(B)(5) 
(West 2009).  The amendment also added definitions of statutory terms based largely on the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s prior decisions interpreting those terms.  See H.R. 394. 
0 6 2_HINES FINAL.DOC 5/27/2010  9:26:06 AM 
1048 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
orders.91  The bill as amended passed both houses swiftly and without 
dissenting votes.92 
In 1999, Alabama’s legislature similarly acted to expand available 
appellate opportunities specifically to benefit defendants seeking to 
challenge class certification orders.  Like Ohio, Alabama rejected the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Coopers, providing immediate 
appeals as of right for plaintiffs denied the right to proceed on a class 
basis.93  But the Alabama Supreme Court still required defendants faced 
with certified classes to seek appellate review by writ of mandamus.94 
Apparently discontented with Alabama’s judicially promulgated 
class action rule in this and other respects,95 the Alabama Legislature 
enacted a statute to regulate a host of class action practices,96 including 
the addition of an immediate right to appeal class certification orders.97  
                                                     
 91. The nonprofit Ohio Legislative Budget Office (OLBO) released a report on the revised bill 
stating that although the 
bill would potentially increase the number of cases that may be heard on appeal, . . . the 
Ohio Judicial Conference and the association of Ohio’s Appellate Court Judges have 
indicated that expanding the definition of ‘final order’ as provided in this bill will affect a 
minimal number of cases and would not increase caseloads to any appreciable extent. 
OLBO, FISCAL NOTE AND LOCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, H.B. 394 (1998), available at http:// 
www.lbo.state.oh.us/122ga/pdf/122/hb0394sp.pdf.  The OLBO also stated that “[c]urrently, there 
may be some cases that are not being appealed because a meaningful or effective remedy is no 
longer available once a final judgment has been rendered.”  Id.  This exact language, however, also 
appeared in the OLBO’s previous fiscal impact statement for the original bill.  See OLBO, FISCAL 
NOTE AND LOCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, H.B. 394 (1997), available at http://www.lbo.state.oh 
/122ga/pdf/122/hb0394in.pdf.  As amended, the bill then swiftly passed both the Senate and the 
House without opposition. 
 92. See OHIO LEGIS. SERV. COMMISSION, 122ND FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, SUB. H.B. 394 (1998). 
 93. See Butler v. Audio/Video Affiliates, Inc., 611 So. 2d 330, 331 n.1 (Ala. 1992) (“We 
recognize that this holding is contrary to current practice in the federal courts, but we reject the 
reasoning of Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay . . . .”).  Twelve years earlier, the Alabama Supreme 
Court cited Coopers far more favorably for the proposition that certification orders were 
interlocutory, and similarly followed federal appellate precedent in holding that Alabama’s § 
1292(b) equivalent was inapplicable to review class certification orders.  See First Ala. Bank of 
Montgomery, N.A. v. Martin, 381 So. 2d 32, 34–36 (Ala. 1980). 
 94. See Ex parte AmSouth Bancorp., 717 So. 2d 357, 361 (Ala. 1998) (“A petition for a writ of 
mandamus is the proper means for reviewing an order certifying a case as a class action.”). 
 95. See Jerome A. Hoffman, Respecting the Rules: The Legislature Tinkers with Rule 23, 60 
ALA. LAW. 404, 408 (1999) (criticizing the legislature’s intrusion into Alabama’s ordinarily careful 
judicial rulemaking process as “carelessly considered,” and amounting to unnecessarily “inflexible 
mandatory complications”).  Several years later, the Alabama Supreme Court’s advisory committee 
more sanguinely observed that the “act works few changes in Rule 23 as the Alabama Supreme 
Court has already interpreted it.”  See Committee Comments to Rule 23 (February 13, 2004). 
 96. Act No. 99-250, 1999 Ala. LAWS 329 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-640–642 (1975)).  The 
Act also added a number of class procedures such as a “full evidentiary hearing on class 
certification,” the application of a “rigorous analysis” standard for class certification determinations, 
and an automatic stay pending appeal.  Id. § 6-5-641. 
 97. ALA. CODE § 6-5-642 (2005).  Given the apparent frequency of writs of mandamus issued 
by the Alabama Supreme Court in the late 1990s to reverse class certification orders, it has been 
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As in Ohio, Alabama’s class action bill passed with no dissenting votes.98  
The Birmingham News reported at the time that the class action bill was 
part of a three-bill package of legislation “aimed at making the state’s 
civil justice system more friendly to businesses.” 99  It should be noted 
that despite this wide-ranging legislative effort to curb state class 
actions,100 Alabama’s courts were still cited by numerous CAFA 
supporters as evidence of the need for federalization of class actions.101 
The next four jurisdictions, D.C., New Mexico, Vermont, and 
Illinois, adopted Rule 23(f) (or its appellate rule equivalent) by judicial 
rulemaking.102  The District of Columbia Superior Court’s adoption of 
Rule 23(f) in 1999 was invalidated several years later.103  The D.C. Court 
of Appeals held that absent express statutory authority or a D.C. Code 
equivalent to § 1292(e), the D.C. Superior Court simply did not have the 
power to “promulgate a jurisdiction-enlarging rule such as Rule 23(f).”104 
                                                                                                                       
suggested that the appellate aspects of this statute may merely have codified a de facto right already 
enjoyed by defendants.  See Danas, supra note 73, at 1325 n.122.  But absent the statutory right of 
appeal, future justices on Alabama’s highest court might not always have been as receptive to 
defendants’ writs. 
 98. See Bill Poovey, Trial Lawyers Spokesman: Tort Bills Not Consumer Aids, BIRMINGHAM 
NEWS, May 28, 1999, at 5C (noting that governor signed class action reform bill “which received 
final approval with no dissenting votes”). 
 99. Stan Bailey, Panel Oks Tort Reform Package, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apil 29, 1999, at 1A.  
The other two bills involved caps on punitive damages awards and venue changes for civil damage 
suits.  Id.; see also Jerry Underwood, Class Action Reform: End to Abuses, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, 
May 23, 1999, at 1D (noting that while the punitive damages bill had received more attention, the 
class action bill was nevertheless “high on the wish list for business interests”).  As the general 
counsel for one of Alabama’s corporations explained, companies want an immediate right to appeal 
certification orders because “‘[t]he clout of a class action is the certification.’”  Underwood, supra. 
 100. See also Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother 
Sailing For Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1709, 1763–67 (2000) (describing a 
concurrent string of Alabama Supreme Court cases conservatively interpreting Alabama’s Rule 23); 
Danas, supra note 73, at 1327–29.  According to Alabama’s Mobile Register, “[b]usiness interests 
effectively took control of the [Alabama Supreme Court] by 1997,” and “members of the business 
community who want to preserve and expand the [1999 legislative tort reforms] plan to focus on 
electing pro-limits judges to the Alabama Supreme Court.”  Jeff Amy, War on Torts Far From Over, 
MOBILE REGISTER, Aug. 24, 1999, at A1. 
 101. See Freer, supra note 40, at 25. 
 102. D.C. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (amended June 22, 1999); N.M. DIST. CT. R. CIV. P. 1-023(F) 
(amended Dec. 4, 2000); VT. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (amended Mar. 6, 2002); ILL. S. CT. R. 306(a)(8)  
(amended Dec. 31, 2002). 
 103. See Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 834 A.2d 875 (D.C. 2003). 
 104. Id. at 880; see also Palmer v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 940 A.2d 742, 751 (Conn. 2008) 
(holding that court lacked Rule 23(f) equivalent jurisdiction to consider appeal from denial of class 
certification in absence of statutory authorization); Salmonsen v. CGD, Inc., 661 S.E.2d 81, 87 (S.C. 
2008) (declining to allow appeal of class certification order in the absence of a state rule or statutory 
equivalent to Rule 23(f) because to do so “would represent a significant departure from [South 
Carolina’s] established appealability jurisprudence”); cf. Royal Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Eason, 961 A.2d 
1161, 1164 n.2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (noting that in the decade since Rule 23(f), Maryland’s 
“Court of Appeals has shown no inclination to change the existing law” by “amend[ing] Maryland’s 
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In New Mexico, the proposed rule received criticism during the 
public comment period from some members of the state plaintiffs’ bar 
echoing many of the objections voiced during consideration of the 
federal rule: the proposed rule would “weaken the class action 
procedure . . . while handing defendants another mechanism to make 
litigation more costly and time consuming.”105  Moreover, the Chief 
Judge of the New Mexico Court of Appeals weighed in, asking “[i]s 
there such a problem with district courts refusing to certify genuine 
questions concerning grant or denial of class certifications that this 
rule . . . [is] necessary?”106  The Rules Committee nonetheless 
recommended the amendment to the New Mexico Supreme Court, which 
adopted it effective in December of 2000.107 
In both New Mexico and Vermont, the rulemaking committees 
commented on their intent to copy108 or “incorporate”109 the federal rule.  
In Vermont, the Reporter’s Notes regarding that state’s 2002 adoption of 
Rule 23(f) included extended excerpts from the Federal Rule 23(f) 
Advisory Committee’s Note, and concluded by pointing out the statutory 
provision “giving the [Vermont] Supreme Court power to hear and make 
rules for appeals before final judgment on questions of law.”110 
Illinois has the most remarkable rulemaking story of the amending 
states.  In 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a press release 
announcing the addition of class action certification rulings to the list of 
orders appealable at the discretion of the appellate courts.111  The Court 
noted that under existing law, such orders were “not appealable until the 
trial of the law suit is completed, often a long process that consumes 
                                                                                                                       
class certification rule to reflect  FRCP 23’s 1998 amendment”). 
 105. See Letter from J.E. Gallegos and Michael P. Gross to Kathleen J. Gibson, Clerk, New 
Mexico Supreme Court 1 (June 9, 2000) (on file with author). 
 106. See Letter from Lynn Pickard, Chief Judge, State of New Mexico Court of Appeals, to 
Kathleen J. Gibson, Clerk, New Mexico Supreme Court (May 22, 2000) (on file with author). 
 107. See N.M. R. CIV. P. 1-023(f); see also Letter from William P. Lynch, Chair, Rules of Civil 
Procedure Committee, to Pamela B. Minzner, Chief Justice, New Mexico Supreme Court 
(September 7, 2000) (reporting on the completion of the committee’s review of 1-023(f) and noting 
that the committee “continues to recommend” the rule’s adoption) (on file with author). 
 108. See Letter from William P. Lynch, Chair, Rules of Civil Procedure Committee, to Pamela 
B. Minzner, Chief Justice, New Mexico Supreme Court (April 25, 2000) (recommending adoption of 
Rule 23(f)) (on file with author). 
 109. See VT. R. CIV. P. 23(f) reporter’s notes (“Rule 23(f) is added to incorporate Federal Rule 
23(f) . . . .”). 
 110. See id.; see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 2386 (2007). 
 111. See Press Release, Illinois Supreme Court, Illinois Supreme Court Allows Early Appeal in 
Class Action Suits, Nov. 27, 2002 [hereinafter 2002 Press Release], http://www.state.il.us 
/court/Media/PressRel/2002Rel.asp; see also Press Release, Illinois Supreme Court, Supreme Court 
Allows Early Appeals on Class Certification, Jan. 3, 2003, http://www.state.il.us/court/Media 
/PressRel/2003Rel.asp (clarifying new rule); ILL. S. CT. R. 306(a)(8)  (amended Dec. 31, 2002). 
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court resources and financial and other resources of the parties.”112  The 
Chief Justice explained that “‘[t]he Court agreed that this would be 
helpful to litigants as well as to those who practice in this area, and that 
such a rule is fair to all sides.’”113  The press release further approvingly 
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had “adopted a similar amendment” 
affecting federal class action practice after “lengthy hearings and 
comment over several years.”114 
Illinois’s appellate rule change occurred after that state’s inclusion 
on the American Tort Reform Association’s 2002 notorious list of the 
nation’s “Judicial Hellholes,” due in large part to its class action 
practices.115  The change also came on the heels of repeatedly thwarted 
efforts in the state’s legislature to statutorily provide the right to 
immediate appeal of class certification orders.116  One member of the 
Court wrote a strong dissent from the order adopting the new rule, 
complaining about the Court’s “almost immediate[]” adoption of the rule 
after receiving “a proposal from a proponent,” particularly in light of the 
legislative history.117  The dissenting justice criticized the Court’s action 
as an unwarranted departure from its usual rulemaking practices: 
To justify this abbreviated amendment procedure, the majority would 
likely explain that the rule is harmless, applying equally to plaintiffs 
and defendants, and simply follows the federal rule.  Although that 
rationale and other reasonable rationales may be correct, the adoption 
of the amendment without public notice, comment, and thoughtful 
deliberations by our Rules Committee runs afoul of our established 
rulemaking process for litigation matters.  This amendment is not 
merely an administrative rule; rather it is a rule directly affecting the 
course of litigation.118 
                                                     
 112. See 2002 Press Release, supra note 111 (quoting Chief Justice Mary Ann G. McMorrow). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, BRINGING JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2002, at 7  
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2002/hellholes_report_2002.pdf. (alleging that class action 
filings in Madison County, Illinois increased by 1850% between 1998–2000 (citing John H. Beisner 
& Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making A Federal Case Out of It . . . in State Court, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 160 (2001))). 
 116. See e.g, S. 1920, 91st General Assembly, Regular Session (Ill. 1999–2000) (allowing class 
action litigants “an absolute right to appeal the circuit court’s decision granting or denying class 
action certification”); Daniel C. Vock, Justices Rewrite Rule on Class Certification, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., Jan. 2, 2003 (reporting the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association’s description of the rule as “a 
big victory for corporations and insurance companies,” and noting that the latter “have sought 
similar changes in the General Assembly for three years”). 
 117. See ILL. S. CT. R. 306(a)(8) (Kilbride, J., dissenting) (amended Dec. 31, 2002). 
 118. Id. 
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The next round of state class action appellate changes occurred 
legislatively.119  Colorado’s legislature, which ordinarily delegates 
rulemaking functions to its Supreme Court, enacted a bill in 2003 
allowing class litigants to seek interlocutory discretionary review from 
the Court of Appeals.120  Until that year, an order denying class 
certification could be appealed as final judgments if the district court 
agreed to certify its order under Colorado’s Rule 54(b),121 but an order 
granting class certification was not immediately appealable.122 
The Colorado Legislature chose to follow the federal lead, allowing 
appeals at the discretion of the appellate court.  The chief imperative 
seems to have been a desire to expand defendants’ appellate 
opportunities in the face of certified class actions: the bill’s sponsor in 
the Senate spoke of the “pressure on defendants to settle” because 
defendants otherwise have to “wait until final judgment has been 
rendered in order to appeal.”123  According to the Denver Post, the bill to 
“allow quick appeals to determine whether a class action lawsuit is 
appropriate” was among a “flurry of bills to limit lawsuits and damage 
awards . . . flying through the legislature” that year.124 
Georgia’s class action practices during this period changed the most 
significantly (and the most often) of any state.  Prior to 2003, Georgia 
                                                     
 119. Although I do not include Texas as an amending state because its statute providing 
appellate review as of right for all class certification orders pre-dated Federal Rule 23(f) by almost 
twenty years, Texas did alter its class action appellate rules in 2003.  In that year, as part of an 
extensive set of revisions to its class action rule that in many respects followed that year’s 
amendments to Federal Rule 23, the Texas Legislature further provided class litigants the right to 
petition the Texas Supreme Court directly from a district court certification order.  See § 1.02(d), 
2003 TEX. GEN. LAWS page no. 850, codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.225(d) (Vernon 
2004). 
 120. See H. 03-1027, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003), codified at COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 13-20-901 (2005). 
 121. See Levine v. Empire Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 557 P.2d 386, 387 (Colo. 1976) (en banc); see 
also COLO. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (requiring an express determination by the district court “that there is no 
just reason for delay,” and “an express direction for the entry of judgment”). 
 122. See Soto v. Progressive Mountain Ins. Co., 181 P.3d 297, 300 (Colo. App. 2007) 
(concluding that pre-2003, “no Colorado cases . . . hold an order granting class certification is 
subject to interlocutory appeal”). 
 123. Senate Committee on Judiciary, Bill Summary for H.B. 03-1027 (Colo. Mar. 3, 2003).  The 
only witness to testify at the Senate hearing, and the only two witnesses to testify at the House 
Committee hearing on the bill, spoke in support of the bill.  See id.; House Committee on Business 
& Labor, Bill Summary for H.B. 03-1027 (Colo. Jan. 16, 2003). 
 124. See Arthur Kane, Bills Target Lawsuits, Damage Awards: A Dozen Measures Would Limit 
Payouts, DENVER POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at B1.  The Colorado Supreme Court, through its rules 
committee, amended its Rule 23 that same year to add an (f) provision that merely referenced the 
new appellate statute, electing not to follow the language of the federal rule.  See Colorado Supreme 
Court Rules Committee, Minutes of Meeting and attachments (August 22, 2003) (on file with 
author); see also COL. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (amended nunc pro tunc July 1, 2003). 
0 6 2_HINES FINAL.DOC 5/27/2010  9:26:06 AM 
2010] MIRRORING OR MUSCLING 1053 
still adhered to the pre-1966 version of Federal Rule 23.125  In 2003, 
however, the Georgia General Assembly rewrote the state’s class rule in 
its entirety, replacing it with the version of Federal Rule 23 then in 
effect.126  The bill’s summary highlighted the addition of the federal 
rule’s provision allowing for “a discretionary immediate appeal, which 
existing state law did not allow.”127  The bill’s chief sponsor in the 
Senate explained that the impetus behind the bill originated from 
representatives of several major Georgia corporations well aware of the 
potential significance to them of CAFA’s likely passage.128  Given 
CAFA’s jurisdictional carve-outs denying a federal forum for mass 
actions brought by large numbers of in-state plaintiffs against in-state 
defendants, Georgia-based companies wanted to ensure that Georgia’s 
state class action rule mirrored the federal rule and specifically provided 
the protection of immediate appellate review.129  The original Senate bill 
included additional provisions based on Alabama’s statute, such as the 
requirement of a full evidentiary class certification hearing and class 
appeals as of right,130 but the final bill, enacted in 2003, followed Rule 
23(f)’s discretionary appellate review language.131 
In 2004, Kansas and Missouri statutorily adopted discretionary rules, 
altering class certification appellate landscapes that otherwise closely 
resembled the pre-Rule 23(f) scene in federal courts.  The Kansas 
Legislature followed its usual statutory rulemaking process, holding 
hearings in both houses on a bill that tracked Federal Rule 23(f) almost 
to the word.132  Indeed, a law professor who appeared in support of the 
                                                     
 125. See Freer, supra note 40, at 22. 
 126. See H. 792, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003), codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-23 (2003); 
see also Ashley S. Harris, Crystal Ferrier, & Andrew S. Lewinter, Civil Practice Act, 20 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 28, 33–39 (2003) (detailing bill’s legislative history). 
 127. Harris et al., supra note 126, at 28. 
 128. Id. at 29–30. 
 129. See id. at 30. 
 130. Id. at 30–31. 
 131. Id. at 36.  The bill easily passed both houses, with only a handful of votes against it and 
several abstentions.  See id. (noting that the bill passed both the House and the Senate between 10:00 
p.m. and midnight on the 40th and last day of Georgia’s legislative session); see also Georgia 
General Assembly, HB 792: Bill History, available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2003-
04/sum/hb792.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2010) (recording legislative history and vote tallies).  The 
class action bill was expanded considerably by the end of its consideration.  It included provisions 
allowing Georgia courts to vacate arbitration awards, changed pre- and post-judgment interest rules 
on civil damage awards, placed limits on the number of times plaintiffs could voluntarily dismiss a 
claim, and gave courts greater discretion to deny jurisdiction in actions involving out-of-state 
defendants.  See H. 792, 2003 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-4-12, 9-
9-13, 9-11-41, 50-2-21, 51-12-14, -71, -72 (2003)). 
 132. See H. 2764, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2004) (codified at Kans. Stat. 60-223(f)).  
Testimony in support of the legislation was given by representatives from the Kansas Chamber of 
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proposed appellate change testified that “absent compelling reasons, the 
Kansas rules of civil procedure should mirror the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”133  That same year, the Missouri General Assembly included 
a provision for the discretionary review of class certification orders in a 
bill addressing a wide range of matters relating to court procedures, such 
as court fees and jury duty procedures.134 
In 2005, the year Congress finally passed CAFA, Georgia, 
Tennessee, Louisiana and Minnesota all acted to amend their state class 
action appeals rules.  Two years and (apparently) no appeals after its 
2003 statute,135 Georgia’s General Assembly returned its attention to the 
state’s class action appellate practices.  This time around, legislators who 
had previously advocated on behalf of Georgia’s corporate community136 
prevailed in securing a right to immediate appellate review of class 
certification orders.137  Indeed, analyzing the impact of CAFA on 
Georgia class actions, an experienced class action plaintiffs’ attorney 
noted that the state’s provision of a right to appeal, as opposed to the 
discretionary review offered in federal courts, “makes class litigation in 
Georgia state courts somewhat less attractive than might otherwise be the 
case.”138 
                                                                                                                       
Commerce, the Kansas Civil Law Forum, a practicing attorney, and the dean of the Washburn 
University School of Law. See Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee: Hearing on HB 2764, 
80th Leg. 1 (2004); Minutes of the Senate Judiciary Committee: Hearing on HB 2764, 80th Leg. 2 
(2004). 
 133. See Minutes of the Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 132, at 2 (testimony of 
Professor James Concannon, Washburn University). 
 134. S. 1211, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2004).  Two years later, the Missouri Supreme 
Court amended its class action rule to include the discretionary appeal provision mandated by the 
2004 statute.  MO. SUP. CT. R. 52.08(f) (amended June 21, 2005). 
 135. See Freer, supra note 40, at 22. 
 136. See State Chamber Focusing on Preserving Pro-Business Climate in Georgia, 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. (SPECIAL REPORT: THE SOUTHEAST), Apr. 1, 2009, at 55 (describing 
Georgia’s 2005 adoption of “a package of legal and civil justice reforms,” including the class action 
appeals legislation, and “an omnibus tort reform bill”).  Indeed, as in 2003, The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution reported that the bill expanding class action appellate opportunities was not the only 
“pro-business” accomplishment of a legislative session the Georgia Chamber of Commerce gleefully 
described as an “extra-extraordinary” one for the “business community.”  See James C. Cobb, As Biz 
Basks in Hotlanta, Folks Feel Chill, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 5, 2005, at A19. 
 137. See S. 19, 148th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 2005 Regular Session (Ga. 2005) (enacted).  
Members of the plaintiffs’ bar had opposed the change, charging that it unduly favored defendants.  
See S. 148-5, Reg. Sess., at 5 (Ga. 2005) (reporting that representatives from Southwire Corporation, 
the Georgia Chamber of Commerce and Southeastern Legal Foundation testified in favor of the bill, 
while a representative of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association testified against it). 
 138. See Carr, supra note 60.  The President of Georgia’s Chamber of Commerce later praised 
the additional protection offered by the statutory appellate right, noting that after seeing “a growing 
number of class action suits in Georgia . . . our companies have been able to take advantage of this 
new law and protect their assets and their stockholders from needless negative impact.”  See 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., supra note 136. 
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With little fanfare, the Tennessee General Assembly also changed its 
class action appellate rules in 2005.  Prior to that year, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court had limited review of class certification orders to either 
an extraordinary appeal or one granted by permission of both the trial 
and the appellate courts.139  Reasoning by analogy to Coopers, the Court 
had also refused to allow a plaintiff’s right to appeal an order denying 
class certification even with a trial court’s Rule 54(b) entry of final 
judgment.140  Tennessee’s statute tracked the substance of Federal Rule 
23(f), allowing appeals at the sole discretion of the appellate courts.141 
The Minnesota Supreme Court also revised its class action rule in 
2005, largely incorporating the Federal Rule 23 amendments of both 
1998 and 2003.142  The addition of Minnesota’s version of Rule 23(f), as 
the Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee Comment observed, effected 
little change in the appealability of class certification orders in the state 
because Minnesota’s appellate courts already permitted discretionary 
review of such orders pursuant to a generic discretionary appeal rule.143 
As in Minnesota, the change in Louisiana’s class action appeals rules 
also seems to have reflected more a codification of existing rights rather 
than a significant expansion of those rights.  Louisiana already allowed 
class certification orders to be reviewed via its supervisory writ 
procedure,144 and the Louisiana Supreme Court had interpreted a statute 
permitting appeals as of right from orders causing “irreparable injury” to 
include class certification orders.145  But in 2005, the Louisiana 
Legislature passed a statute that specifically codified the appealability of 
class certification orders.146 
                                                     
 139. See TENN. R. APP. P. 9 & 10; see also Meighan v. U.S. Sprint Comm’ns Co., 924 S.W.2d 
632, 635 (Tenn. 1997) (granting both extraordinary and interlocutory appeal of order certifying 
class). 
 140. See Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 557–59 (Tenn. 1990). 
 141. Act of May 28, 2005 ch. 280, § 1, 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts 496–97 (amending appeals 
procedure (codified at TENN. CODE. ANN. § 27-1-125 (2005)). 
 142. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 23, advisory committee’s cmt. to 2006 Amendment, available at 48 
MINN. STAT. ANN. at 281 (2006) (amended November 30, 2005) (noting that the amendments 
“extensively revamped” Rule 23, and “primarily adopt the amendments made to federal rule 23 in 
2003”). 
 143. Id. at 282 (citing Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., 645 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2002)). 
 144. See Hamilton Med. Group v. Ochsner Health Plan, 550 So. 2d 290, 292 (La. Ct. App. 1989) 
(rendering decision on a supervisory writ application in a challenge based on improper venue). 
 145. See Davis v. Jazz Casino Co., 849 So. 2d 497, 498 (La. 2003); Carr v. GAF, Inc., 702 So. 
2d 1384, 1385 (La. 1997). 
 146. 2005 La. Acts 1475–76 (codified at LA. CODE CIV. PROC ANN. ART. 592(A)(3)(b)).  The 
statute also provided class litigants the right to request from the trial court detailed findings of fact 
and law following any certification decision.  See id. 
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The last two amending states, Indiana and Montana, amended their 
appellate rules in 2007 to include class action specific provisions.  Prior 
to that year, class certification orders had been held by Indiana’s 
Supreme Court to be interlocutory and not immediately appealable 
absent the trial court’s entry of final judgment pursuant to Indiana Rule 
54(b).147  In 2007, however, after a public comment period and on the 
recommendation of its rules committee, the Indiana Supreme Court 
exercised its rulemaking and “inherent authority to supervise the 
administration of all courts of this state” by amending its appellate 
procedure rules to provide discretionary appeals from interlocutory 
orders “granting or denying class certification” under Indiana’s Rule 
23.148 
Unlike Indiana, which followed the federal policy of discretionary 
class appeals, Montana altered its appellate rules to provide an appeal as 
of right for all class certification orders.  Montana had long provided an 
appeal as of right to rejected class plaintiffs, but it had not extended that 
same appellate access to defendants faced with certified classes.149  After 
a comment period and public meetings, the Montana Supreme Court in 
2007 adopted several amendments to its appellate rule, including appeals 
from orders “permitting or refusing to permit an action to be maintained 
as a class action.”150 
IV. MAKING SENSE OF STATE EXPANSIONS OF CLASS CERTIFICATION 
APPEALS: THE REPLICA THEORY AND THE INTEREST GROUP 
THEORY 
This Part explores two principal hypotheses in an attempt to shed 
light on why states might have amended their rules to expand class 
litigant access to interlocutory appellate review.  First, given the marked 
uptick in state changes in the wake of Rule 23(f),151 this part considers 
                                                     
 147. See Martin v. Amoco Oil Co., 696 N.E.2d 383, 385–86 (Ind. 1998).  The Martin Court 
overruled a line of intermediate appellate court decisions finding such orders to be final and 
appealable.  See, e.g., American Cynamid Co. v. Stephen, 600 N.E.2d 1387, 1387 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1992). 
 148. Indiana Supreme Court Order No. 94S00 (2008) (amending Rules of Appellate Procedure); 
IND. R. APP. P. 14(C). 
 149. See State ex. rel. Anaconda Aluminum Co. v. Dist. Ct., 490 P.2d 351, 352 (Mont. 1971) 
(explaining that although appeals as of right from denials of class certification were expressly 
included in appellate rule 23, the 1967 Advisory Committee’s Note to that rule made clear that 
“[t]here does not seem to be a corresponding necessity for direct appeal” from orders granting class 
certification). 
 150. MONT. R. APP. P. 6(3)(d) (enacted by Supreme Court Order No. AF 07-0016 (2007)). 
 151. See supra Figure 1. 
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whether the increase in access to state appellate courts can best be 
explained as resulting from a continuing preference among some states to 
track changes in the Federal Rules.  Second, it examines whether such 
state appellate developments instead reflect the pressures political 
interest groups have brought to bear in certain targeted states.  Even if 
Federal Rule 23(f) itself was arguably a non-partisan, neutral rule, state 
rulemaking processes may be more susceptible to interest group 
influences,152 perhaps particularly in the post-CAFA era.  I refer to these 
theories as the “Replica Theory” and the “Interest Group Theory,” and 
test each in several ways. 
First, I look to the number of states in each category that as of July 1, 
1998, imposed limits on class action appeals,153 measuring the 
percentage of those states that then amended to expand their class action 
appellate rules.154  I then compare the resulting rate of states that 
amended in each category to determine if the categorization applied 
helps to explain which states chose to amend.  Second, I consider the 
percentage of states in each category that “pre-amendment” (as of July 1, 
1998) already had expansive class action appellate rules (either by the 
sole discretion of the appeals courts or as of right), and compare that to 
the percentage of states in each category that provide such appellate 
rights as of today, which I refer to as the “post-amendment” status of 
those states (as of July 1, 2009).  This measure may help to explain why 
states in some categories might have been less likely to amend in the first 
instance: they already provided appellate rights that were the equivalent 
of Rule 23(f) or, in many cases, greater class litigant access to 
interlocutory review by authorizing such appeals as of right. 
As discussed in the introduction, the data that follow permit only 
qualified conclusions.  The small sample sizes of states in various 
categories, in particular, may exaggerate apparent results.  Moreover, 
although I have attempted to account for confounding variables where 
possible, I did not conduct multivariate regression analyses.  As detailed 
                                                     
 152. Cf. Richard Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 299, 314 (2008) (noting that “despite 
lobbying, the [federal] rulemaking process has not displayed anything like the sorts of partisan or 
otherwise political traits that one would find in . . . a state legislature”). 
 153. See supra Table 1.  In addition to state appellate limits comparable to the pre-Rule 23(f) 
federal court limits, recall that several states at this time only permitted appeals for plaintiffs denied 
the opportunity to pursue litigation on a class action basis.  Those states, which required defendants 
challenging a class certification order to do so via extraordinary appellate review, are included in my 
definition of “States With Limited Interlocutory Appeals.” See supra note 73 and accompanying 
text. 
 154. Two states, Minnesota and Louisiana, amended their class action rules in a manner each 
described as reflecting a codification of preexisting appellate rights.  These amending states are 
considered in both measures to be states that already provided expanded appellate rights. 
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in Part III, each state’s unique amendment experience involved an array 
of factors difficult to untangle: the state’s prior appellate treatment of 
class certification orders, the rulemaking process (judicial or legislative) 
by which a state adopted the new appellate jurisdictional rule, the scope 
of the appellate rights extended to class litigants, the state’s population 
and political makeup, the interrelationship among each state’s judicial, 
legislative and executive branches, the presence or history of interest 
group influences, the extent to which the state’s class action practices 
may have been influenced by federal class action law generally, and the 
nature of class action activity in each state.  And these confounding 
variables were often even more difficult to examine in the control group 
of states that still limit appellate access for class litigants.  Finally, this 
article is the first part of a larger and ongoing research project, so any 
conclusions are necessarily provisional and preliminary.  The data, 
however, do reveal some interesting results and permit some 
conclusions, albeit tentative ones. 
A. The Replica Theory 
Judge Charles E. Clark, the principal drafter of the Federal Rules, 
expressed his fond hope that a thoughtful set of uniform federal rules 
could serve as “a model to all the states.”155  In the decades following the 
adoption of the Federal Rules, a majority of states did indeed amend their 
procedural rules to replicate the federal provisions, in broad measure if 
not in virtual lockstep.156  Judge Clark followed such state adoptions 
closely and reported them “with paternal pride.”157  Professor Charles 
Alan Wright carried on the work of surveying state procedural systems  
 
                                                     
 155. Charles E. Clark & James WM. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L. J. 387, 
387 (1935); see also Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A 
Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 320 (2001) (describing belief at the time of the Rules Enabling Act 
that “the Federal Rules would be so enlightened and simple that intra-state uniformity would follow 
naturally as states voluntarily adopted the federal model”); Subrin, supra note 7, at 80 (describing 
Rules Enabling Act advocates’ view that the superiority of the Federal Rules would make the states 
“see the light and follow suit”); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: 
Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002–06 
(1989). 
 156. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State 
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1367–69 (1986). 
 157. Id. at 1368 n. 7.  Indeed, even before the promulgation of Federal Rules, Judge Clark 
cheered the increasing number of state adoptions of code pleading procedural systems, both as a 
policy matter and because of his belief in the value of uniform procedural systems.  See id. (citing 
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 19–20 (1928)). 
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and the influence of the Federal Rules model, confirming in 1960 an 
“accelerating trend in the states toward adoption of the federal rules.”158 
The experience in Arizona, the first state to adopt the Federal Rules, 
illustrates why some states might be inclined to adopt federal procedural 
rules.  Those in favor of adopting the federal rules in Arizona cited the 
low costs and many benefits of replication.159  Arizona’s comparatively 
small rulemaking resources could hardly match those of the Supreme 
Court, with its cadre of experts and a lengthy process encompassing the 
views of lawyers nationwide.160  And not only would the resulting 
product of such expertise likely be of good quality, local lawyers familiar 
with the same set of rules could “feel at home” in any federal court 
throughout the country.161 
The replication trend had “slowed to a creep” by 1986, however, 
when a comprehensive survey of state procedural laws revealed that less 
than half the states could then be characterized as “true federal 
replicas.”162  Moreover, even “when a looser test than replication was 
applied to classify states as generally following the model of the Federal 
Rules, the resulting tally embraced a majority of states but a minority of 
our national population.”163  In other words, the survey found a 
correlation between states inclined to adopt the federal rules and those 
with the smallest populations.164  The most populous states, on the other 
hand, were more likely to resist replication, “stick[ing] to their 
procedural guns.”165  And, in the last few decades even replica states 
                                                     
 158. 1 WILLIAM W. BARRON & ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
WITH FORMS foreword at iii (Charles Alan Wright ed. 1960); see id. at 43–46 (given the superiority 
of the Federal Rules, “the proponents of uniform state rules of procedure patterned on the federal 
rules make a strong case”); see also Oakley & Coon, supra note 156, at 1367 (“Then barely two 
decades old, the Federal Rules appeared to be the harbinger of substantial uniformity in American 
civil procedure.”). 
 159. See Subrin, supra note 155, at 2026–28 (citing Allen, The New Rules in Arizona, 16 F.R.D. 
183, 184 (1954)); cf. 1 Conn. Practice Book, Super. Ct. Civ. Rules § 9-8 (2009) (adopting Federal 
Rule 23 in Connecticut, where “class action litigation is rare . . . and the resulting body of state case 
law is light,” allows that state “to access useful case law from thirty three states and the District of 
Columbia, all of which have adopted [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23] or some variation of it”). 
 160. See Subrin, supra note 155, at 2026–28.  Other western states with fairly low populations, 
Colorado, New Mexico and Utah, followed suit shortly after Arizona.  Id. at 2028. 
 161. Id. at 2027 (citing Lyle Roger Allen, The New Rules in Arizona, 16 F.R.D. 183, 184 
(1954)). 
 162. Oakley & Coon, supra note 156, at 1369; see also Oakley, supra note 7, at 358–59 
(explaining that after 1975, the pace of both “true” federal rule replication and procedural reforms in 
the general direction of the federal model grounded “almost to a halt”). 
 163. Oakley & Coon, supra note 156, at 1369. 
 164. Id. at 1426 (concluding that “systematic state court affinity for the Federal Rules is heavily 
concentrated among the less populous states”). 
 165. See Subrin, supra note 155, at 2044–45; see also Seymour Moskowitz, Discovery in State 
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have increasingly demonstrated a willingness to deviate from the federal 
model.166 
The Replica Theory, then, requires an examination of the degree to 
which a state’s replica status might explain its adoption of Rule 23(f), or 
the amendment of its rules to effectively expand appellate access for 
class litigants.  I begin testing the Replica Theory by examining the 
extent to which “replica” states, variously defined, have amended their 
class action appellate rules. 
A state’s replica status may best be gauged by whether its class 
action rule at the time of Rule 23(f) already generally replicated Federal 
Rule 23 (what I call “Replica Rule 23 states”), surely the most obvious 
sign of a state’s interest in mirroring federal class action practices.167  
Alternatively, I define replica states as those states identified by 
Professor John Oakley as basing their state procedural rules on the 
Federal Rules as a whole.168  The Replica Theory here suggests that 
states generally adopting the Federal Rules would be more disposed to 
amend their rules to track federal changes to those rules than states that 
had never adopted the Federal Rules in the first place.  I next examine 
the extent to which states that generally adopted the Federal Rules later 
amended their rules to adopt various non-class action federal rule 
amendments.  The Replica Theory here would predict that states with 
high adoption rates of subsequent federal amendments would be more 
likely to adopt Rule 23(f) than replica states whose low adoption rate of 
new federal amendments may suggest an increasing unwillingness to 
follow the federal lead.  Finally, I examine the possible “replica” effect 
of a state’s inclination to model its rules not necessarily on parallel 
federal rules but rather those of its sister states.169  This measure of a 
replica effect is particularly difficult to measure, but the Replica Theory 
would suggest a correlation between a state’s likelihood of adopting 
uniform state laws and its likelihood of amending its class action rules to 
expand appellate access. 
                                                                                                                       
Civil Procedure: The National Perspective, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 121, 28 (2007) (praising the 
innovative discovery reforms in “states with large populations and high volume courts”). 
 166. See, e.g., Seymour Moskowitz, Rediscovering Discovery: State Procedural Rules and the 
Level Playing Field, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 595, 647 (2002) (speculating that recent state discovery 
innovations and experiments “may be the harbinger of a future procedural regime”). 
 167. Cf. 1 Conn. Practice Book, Super. Ct. Civ. Rules § 9-8 (adopting current version of Federal 
Rule 23 “with minor variations” to enable Connecticut courts and litigants to more predictably rely 
on precedents interpreting Federal Rule 23). 
 168. See Oakley, supra note 7, at 355–58; see also Oakley & Coon, supra note 156, at 1372–78. 
 169. See, e.g., Koppel, supra note 7, at 1194–1201 (extolling the benefits to be gained by states 
coordinating with each other to achieve interstate procedural uniformity). 
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1. Replica Federal Rule 23 States 
To study the correlation between replica Federal Rule 23 states and 
states that amended their appellate rules with respect to class certification 
orders, I categorized each of the 49 jurisdictions with a general class 
action rule as either a “replica Rule 23” state or a “variant class action” 
state.  This methodology examined each state’s class action rule as of 
1998, characterizing as a “replica Rule 23” state one with judicially or 
statutorily codified rules that either copied the 1966 version of Federal 
Rule 23 verbatim or did so with only slight modifications.170  I 
categorized states that eliminated or merged significant provisions of the 
Federal Rule171 or maintained the pre-1966 version of Federal Rule 23172 
as “variant class action” states.  The variant category also includes states 
whose class action rules more dramatically deviated from Federal Rule 
23, such as those based on the Field Code173 or the Uniform Class 
Actions Act.174 
With respect to the replica Rule 23 category, I found that 50% of 
replica Rule 23 states expanded class action litigant access to 
interlocutory review in the wake of the amendment of Federal Rule 23(f).  
On the other hand, only 20% of states with variant class action rules did 
so in the same period.  The data in Figure 4, however, suggest that the 
lower amendment rate for variant class action rule states may at least 
partly be a function of the fact that a greater percentage of variant class 
action rule states than replica Rule 23 states already had class action 
interlocutory appeals.  As shown in Figure 4, 52% of “variant class 
action” states already provided interlocutory appeals of class certification 
orders pre-Rule 23(f), and 62% of variant class action states now allow 
such appeals.  On the other hand, only 21% of replica Rule 23 states 
permitted such appeals pre-Rule 23(f), rising to 61% of replica Rule 23 
                                                     
 170. See Rowe, supra note 77, at 147–48 (observing that “a considerable majority of American 
states track Federal Rule 23, at least in its 1966 version . . . closely and in a good many cases word 
for word”). 
 171. See, e.g., id. at 153 (citing Illinois’s omission of the typicality requirement); id. at 156 
(citing New Hampshire and South Carolina’s omission of Federal Rule 23(b) counterparts); id. at 
157–58 (citing Oregon and Pennsylvania as states that treat predominance as only one consideration 
in a “multi-factor list”). 
 172. See id. at 149–50 (discussing North Carolina’s adherence to the original Federal Rule 23).  
In 1998, Georgia also still remained in this category, although it later adopted the 1966 version of 
Rule 23.  See Freer, supra note 40, at 22; supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
 173. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (2009); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 803.08 (2009); Rowe, supra note 77, at 149. 
 174. See Rowe, supra note 77, at 150 (describing the Uniform Class Actions Act or Model Class 
Action Rule promulgated in 1976 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, thus far adopted only by Iowa and North Dakota). 
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states today.  At the end of the day, then, the percentage of states that 
now provide expanded interlocutory appeal rights for class litigants is 
virtually the same between replica Rule 23 states (61%) and variant class 
action states (62%). 
Figure 4: Availability of Interlocutory Appeals, 



























 Despite this apparent parity, it seems nonetheless significant that 
fully half of the replica Rule 23 states chose to amend their class action 
rules to expand appellate rights in the wake of Rule 23(f), perhaps 
especially so given the low percentage of replica Rule 23 states that 
provided such appellate rights before Rule 23(f).  Post-Rule 23(f), then, 
half of the replica states that had previously tracked federal court limits 
on class action appeals similarly moved in the direction of the federal 
rule to provide expanded appellate access for class litigants.  On the 
other hand, 80% of variant class action states that could have amended 
their class action procedures to expand appellate access failed to do so, 
even though variant class action states as a whole were far more likely to 
provide such appeals in the pre-Rule 23(f) world. 
When one looks more closely at the replica Rule 23 states, however, 
that 50% amendment rate may exaggerate the degree of replication.  
While eleven out of twenty-two replica Rule 23 states indeed amended 
post-Rule 23(f), only eight states did so in true synchronicity with Rule 
23(f) itself, authorizing appellate courts the unilateral discretion to 
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review class certification orders.  Three of the eleven states (27%) that 
amended their class appellate rules post-Rule 23(f) did not replicate the 
federal approach, instead providing automatic appeals of class 
certification orders as a matter of right.  This non-conformity among so-
called “replica” states brings the percentage of states that amended post-
Rule 23(f) in actual conformity with the federal rule down to 36%, with 
14% of the replica Rule 23 states expanding appellate access far more 
dramatically than the federal approach allows.175 
2. Replica Federal Rules States 
Professor John Oakley, following in the footsteps of Judge Clark and 
Charles Alan Wright before him, conducted two comprehensive surveys 
of state procedural rules evaluating relative degrees of federal rules 
replication.176  In his seminal 1986 work, co-authored by Arthur Coon, 
Professor Oakley painstakingly analyzed each state and determined its 
proper replica category, including “true” federal rules replica states;177 
those that largely replicated the federal rules but did so by statute rather 
than by judicially promulgated rule;178 and those with a “strong affinity” 
to the federal rules but that nevertheless fell slightly short of “true” 
replica status.179 
The Replica Theory would suggest that states Professor Oakley 
identified in 1986 as “replica” states, including all the categories listed 
above, would be more likely than non-replica states to amend their class 
action appellate rules to track Federal Rule 23(f).180  This list has much 
overlap with the list of “replica Rule 23” states I created above, but also 
includes states whose state procedural rules tracked the content and 
organization of the federal rules overall, but which did not have a class 
action rule that reflected the major 1966 overhaul of Rule 23.181 
                                                     
 175. Indeed, Judge Scirica, on behalf of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, argued fiercely against class appeals as of right in federal courts on the ground that 
automatic appeals would substantially undermine the carefully crafted procedural policies reflected 
in Rule 23(f).  See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 156; Oakley, supra note 7. 
 177. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 156, at 1377 (referring to this as “our cardinal 
classification”). 
 178. Id. at 1378 (citing Kansas, Georgia, North Carolina, and Oklahoma in this category). 
 179. Id. at 1377–78.  Included in this category are Arkansas, Delaware, and South Carolina, 
which used a “higher standard of factual specificity in pleading,” as well as Idaho and Nevada, 
whose largely replicating rules fail some Oakley/Coon criterion for “true” replication.  Id. 
 180. See id. (describing non-replica states that adopted either an “Idiosyncratic Rules-Based 
Procedural Systems” or “Fact Pleading/Code-Based Procedural System”). 
 181. Georgia, North Dakota, and North Carolina all fit this description. 
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Figure 5: Availability of Interlocutory Appeals, 


























Comparing relative rates of amendment for the two Oakley 
categories, I found that 46% of replica federal rules states amended post-
Rule 23(f), while only 25% of variant rules states did the same.  These 
numbers are quite similar to the replica Rule 23 and variant class action 
rule rates, but with a slightly smaller percentage of replica rules states 
amending and a slightly larger percentage of` variant rules states 
amending.  Indeed, Figure 5 shows a pattern similar to the one in Figure 
4: while only 25% of replica rules states allowed expanded opportunities 
for class interlocutory appeals prior to Rule 23(f), 59% of the states in 
that category did so by 2009.  For variant rules states, 53% already 
provided such appeals in 1998, and the amending states in that category 
raised the total today to 65%.  By 2009, then, variant rules states proved 
slightly more likely to provide expanded appellate opportunities than 
replica rules states, but post-Rule 23(f) replica rules states amended at a 
higher rate than variant states. 
As in the case of replica Rule 23 states, however, these findings 
likely overstate the degree of state replication of Rule 23(f).  Again, if 
replication is defined as following Rule 23(f)’s discretionary class 
appeals approach, only seven of the eleven replica rules states truly 
replicated Rule 23(f), while four of the eleven provided automatic 
appeals to class litigants.  The result is that if one looks at actual replica 
behavior, 29% of the replica Rule 23 states amended in conformity with 
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Rule 23(f), while another 14% of the replica Rule 23 states amended 
only in the overall direction of the federal change (from limited to 
expanded class appeals). 
3. Replica States by Rate of Federal Rule Amendment Adoptions: The 
Oakley Scale 
In 2003, Professor Oakley took a “fresh look” at the replication 
status of replica federal rules states,182 examining the rates at which those 
states “continued to conform to the Federal Rules” by amending their 
state procedures to track major federal rule amendments of the 1980s and 
1990s.183  To conduct this research, Professor Oakley chose twelve 
amendments to the Federal Rules he characterized as significant enough 
to indicate “pro tanto textual disuniformity between state and federal 
procedure if not adopted by a state that otherwise conforms to the federal 
rules.”184 
The states in the Oakley study varied dramatically in their adoption 
rate of the twelve amendments he identified.  The overall adoption rate 
among all replica rules states was 42%, with almost one third of the 
states adopting either 42% or 50% of the amendments.185  With its 92% 
adoption rate, Utah topped the list of replica states, demonstrating the 
highest degree of conformity with the selected federal rule 
amendments.186  South Dakota, at the other extreme, adopted none of the 
amendments Oakley examined.187  
                                                     
 182. Professor Oakley limited this survey to states identified in his 1986 work as “substantially 
conforming to the federal model of civil procedure,” states I have herein referred to as “replica rules 
states.”  Oakley, supra note 7, at 354. 
 183. Id. at 360–61 (detailing the specific amendments and criteria used by Professor Oakley). 
 184. Id. at 359.  Professor Oakley also examined a thirteenth amendment, the 2000 federal 
amendment to Rule 26, but because of that amendment’s “recent enactment, [he] considered it apart 
from the other sample amendments as an index of state willingness to conform to the federal model.”  
Id. at 360.  As that amendment also occurred two years after Rule 23(f), I do not include adoptions 
(or non-adoptions) of it in my analysis, and limit my data to the twelve 1980–1993 amendments that 
are the central focus of Oakley’s research. 
 185. See id. at 387 tbl. 3. 
 186. See id. at 371–72, 387 tbl. 3. 
 187. See id. at 370–71, 387 tbl. 3. 
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Figure 6: States With Limited Interlocutory 
Appeals
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The Replica Theory would posit that states demonstrating a 
relatively high rate of federal amendment adoption in the Oakley study 
also would be relatively more likely than states at the lower end of that 
scale to amend their procedural rules to adopt Rule 23(f).  Figure 6 
shows the percentage of states that amended to expand appellate review 
in class actions in each of six ranges on the Oakley scale.188  While there 
were no amendments among states in the lowest and highest bands, states 
in the four middle bands189 all hover around a 50% rate of amendments 
expanding class action appeals.190 
The reason no states at the lowest end of the Oakley scale191 likely 
adopted Rule 23(f) is presumably explained by Figure 7: they each 
provided expanded appellate access for class litigants well before Rule 
                                                     
 188. Because of the uneven distribution of states, the bands examined do not include equal 
numbers of states.  There are three states in both the 0% to 8% and the 75% to 92% categories, five 
states in the 58% to 67% category, and seven states in the 17% to 25%, 33% to 42%, and 50% 
categories. 
 189. These four bands include states with adoption rates of Oakley’s selected federal 
amendments ranging from 17% to 67%. 
 190. The numbers in each band are so low that the 57% rate in the band of states adopting 33–
42% of Oakley’s amendments is likely statistically indistinguishable from 50%. 
 191. These states adopted between 0% and 8% of the selected Oakley amendments. 
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23(f).  The general lack of conformity with other federal rule 
amendments among states at the lowest end of the Oakley scale may 
make sense of the pre-existing availability of appellate review in those 
states: their treatment of class appeals pre-Rule 23(f) reflects the same 
disuniformity with federal procedural practices as their disinclination to 
replicate other federal rule amendments from 1980–2000. 
Figure 7: Availability of Interlocutory Appeals,












0-8 17-25 33-42 50 58-67 75-92














As Figure 7 reveals, however, none of the states at the highest end of 
the Oakley scale192 provided similar appellate opportunities pre-Rule 
23(f).  Their pre-Rule 23(f) limitation on class appeals certainly aligns 
closely with the pre-1998 federal approach, but the failure of any of 
those states to amend post-Rule 23(f) is far less easy to explain given 
their high degree of replication with respect to other federal rule 
amendments.193  On the other hand, 80% of states in the second highest 
band194 today offer expanded interlocutory class appeals, a high rate that 
might have been predicted for such states previously demonstrating a 
                                                     
 192. States in this highest band adopted between 75% and 92% of the Oakley amendments. 
 193. At least part of the answer to this riddle may lie simply in the exceedingly small number of 
states at the highest end of the Oakley scale. 
 194. States in this band adopted 58% to 67% of the Oakley amendments. 
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high degree of federal rule amendment replication.  But Figure 7 shows 
that those states also registered a 60% rate of providing such expanded 
appeals even before Rule 23(f), a degree of pre-Rule 23(f) non-
conformity with the federal appeals policy that rivals that of the states at 
the lowest (and most non-conforming) end of the Oakley scale. 
The treatment of class action appeals among states in the second, 
third, and fourth bands195 appears to fit most closely with Replica Theory 
expectations, with low rates (between 0% and 14%) of pre-Rule 23(f) 
expanded class appeals and post-Rule 23(f) rates that fall just under 60%.  
Nonetheless, the overall data presented in Figures 6 and 7 supply little 
support for a correlation between replica states’ overall rate of continued 
replication and a state’s likelihood of replicating the approach taken in 
Federal Rule 23(f).  States that we would have expected to adopt Rule 
23(f), based on their track record of replicating other federal rule 
amendments at the highest rates, did not do so.  And states in the next 
highest band already provided expanded class appeals at a rate 
inconsistent with a desire to replicate the federal class appellate 
approach, although perhaps the post-Rule 23(f) amending states in that 
band were motivated to amend on that basis. 
4. Adoption of Uniform Laws as Measure of Replica Theory 
Absent a comprehensive survey of state procedural laws examining 
the extent to which states adopt rules seeking to replicate or achieve 
uniformity with those of other states rather than the federal rules, it is 
difficult to readily test a state-based replica effect.  Such an effect surely 
must exist to some extent, as states regularly coordinate through a 
number of organizations to promulgate uniform guidelines and laws.196  
North Dakota’s class action rule, for example, is based on the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’ (“NCCUSL”) 
Uniform Class Actions Act/Model Class Action Rule rather than on 
                                                     
 195. States in these bands adopted between 17% and 50% of the Oakley amendments. 
 196. One recent example of states’ efforts to engage in parallel, coordinated rulemaking can be 
seen in the state court guidelines on electronic discovery released by a joint working group of the 
Conference of Chief Judges and National Center for State Courts in 2006, the same year the 
Supreme Court approved extensive amendments to the Federal Rules on the same subject.  See 
Conference of Chief Justices & National Center for State Courts, Working Group on Electronic 
Discovery, Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of Electronically-Stored 
Information (2006), http://www.ncsonline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf.  A court in one 
state categorized by Oakley as a federal rules replica state, for example, recently relied in part on 
these guidelines to determine a “reasonable approach” to the e-discovery dispute at issue.  See Beard 
Research, Inc. v. Kates, 981 A.2d 1175, 1187 n. 66 (Del. Ch. 2009); see also Oakley, supra note 7, 
at 379–81. 
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Federal Rule 23,197 even though its procedural rules in other significant 
respects qualified it as a “replica” federal rules state in the Oakley 
surveys.198  Indeed, NCCUSL actively seeks to promote the goal of 
uniform state laws.199 
In 1996, Professors Larry Ribstein and Bruce Kobayashi examined 
the rate at which states adopted 103 uniform laws promulgated by 
NCCUSL.200  While the Uniform Class Action Act is one of the uniform 
laws in Ribstein and Kobayashi’s study, it is one of the rare procedural 
proposals offered by the NCCUSL.  The uniform laws surveyed run the 
substantive gamut from laws governing limited partnerships to trans-
boundary pollution, from antitrust to child custody, from probate to 
extradition and rendition.201  While states’ relative adoption rates of 
substantive uniform laws, therefore, may be far from a perfect indicator 
of a state’s likelihood of adopting procedural rules based on a desire to 
replicate those of other states, it may nonetheless shed some light on the 
relative inclination among states to follow uniform guidelines emanating 
from state-based rather than federal sources.202 
Using the Ribstein and Kobayashi data,203 I examined the possible 
correlation between a state’s uniform law adoption ranking and its 
likelihood of amending its rules to expand interlocutory appellate access 
                                                     
 197. See Rowe, supra note 77, at 150. 
 198. See Oakley, supra note 7, at 368–69; Oakley & Coon, supra note 156, at 1412. 
 199. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State 
Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 135 (1996) (explaining that “the history suggests that both the 
NCCUSL and state legislators have sought to achieve the maximum possible level of uniformity of 
state laws”). 
 200. Id.  Ribstein and Kobayashi’s economic analysis identified the risk of inefficient and 
“inappropriate uniformity” that may occur when states widely adopt “inappropriate uniform laws” 
promulgated by the NCCUSL.  Id. at 135. 
 201. See id. app. at 188–93 (Table A1). 
 202. Ribstein and Kobayashi found that whether a state’s legislature was full-time or part-time 
proved to be a statistically significant indicator of a state’s likelihood of adopting uniform laws.  See 
id. at 169–71.  Their findings supported the hypothesis that states are “more likely to adopt uniform 
laws when the legislature serves only part-time.  In this situation, the legislature lacks the time and 
expertise to innovate.”  Id.  Given that half of the states post-Rule 23(f) amended their class 
appellate rules by judicial rather than legislative rulemaking, examination of a possible correlation 
between Ribstein and Kobayashi’s part-time and full-time legislature hypothesis and a state’s 
likelihood of expanding appellate rules for class litigants is beyond the scope of this Article.  An 
analogous hypothesis, however, may help to explain the high concentration of federal rule replica 
states among those states with the lowest populations, as they also may have fewer resources to 
devote to the development of state-specific procedural rules.  See Oakley & Coon, supra note 156, at 
1426 (“States with large populations seemed to be less likely to have systematically modeled their 
civil procedures on the Federal Rules than less populous states.”).  But see Ribstein & Kobayashi, 
supra note 199, at 174 (finding population not to be a statistically significant predictor of uniform 
law adoption). 
 203. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 199, at 170–71 (Table 4: Average Change in 
Probabilities from State Fixed Effects — by Type of Legislature and Rank: Probit Analysis). 
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for class litigants.  The Replica Theory here would suggest that states on 
the high end of the Ribstein and Kobayashi rankings (demonstrating a 
high inclination to adopt rules seeking interstate uniformity) would be 
most likely to track or borrow what they perceived to be an increasingly 
“uniform” class action procedure in other states.  On the other hand, the 
Replica Theory suggests that states on the low end of the Ribstein and 
Kobayashi rankings would be less likely to amend their rules to seek 
some degree of conformity or uniformity with sister states, as those states 
previously demonstrated a significant disinclination to adopt uniform 
state laws promulgated by the NCCUSL. 
Figure 8:  States With Limited Interlocutory Appeals
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Figure 8 shows the percentage of amending states in each quintile of 
the Ribstein and Kobayashi rankings.  As one can see in even a cursory 
glance at the data in Figure 8, the predicted effects are not borne out.  Of 
the states with the lowest uniform law adoption rate, in the bottom 
quintile of states (ranked 41 to 50), 83% adopted amendments expanding 
interlocutory appeals for class certification orders.  By comparison, only 
43% of states in the highest quintile (ranked 1 to 10) similarly acted to 
expand class action appellate rules.  The percentage of states adopting 
class action appeal amendments rises steadily upwards in the middle 
three bands, with the third quintile (ranked 21 to 30) amending at a 
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higher rate than the second (ranked 11 to 20), and the states in the fourth 
quintile (ranked 31 to 40) amending at a still higher rate than the third.204 
 
Figure 9: Availability of Interlocutory Appeals, 
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Figure 9 shows the same Ribstein and Kobayashi state adoption 
rankings, here comparing the percentage of states in each quintile that 
already had expanded class action appeals rules pre-Rule 23(f) and the 
percentage that provide such appellate opportunities today.  The jump 
among states in the lowest quintile (ranked 41 to 50 in uniform law 
adoptions) still appears to be evident, with 30% of states in that group 
providing expanded appeals pre-amendment and fully 90% post-
amendment.  The first (ranked 1 to 10) and fourth (ranked 31 to 40) 
quintiles look much the same, each with 20% pre-amendment and 50% 
to 60% post-amendment, while the second quintile reveals the least 
reaction (22% of states pre-amendment and 33% post-amendment 
provided expanded class interlocutory appeals).  The third quintile, on 
the other hand, reveals a notable 60% of states pre-amendment and a 
final 70% tally of states post-amendment providing expanded appeals. 
                                                     
 204. Virginia and Mississippi, excluded from my analysis in Figure 7, ranked 18th and 48th 
(respectively) in the study. 
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In summary, it is hard to discern any support from these data for a 
replica effect based on the class action appellate practices of sister states.  
States one might predict would be most interested in following an 
increasingly “uniform” rule followed in other states did move from 20% 
permitting class action appeals pre-Rule 23(f) to 60% today, but the next 
highest quintile amended at a far lower rate.  Those in the middle of the 
pack in the third quintile were notably more likely to have expanded 
class appeals pre-amendment, for reasons not easily explained by their 
relative inclination to adopt uniform laws.  And the states most 
seemingly independent and unlikely to adopt uniform law proposals 
acted the most dramatically to amend their class action appellate rules in 
the wake of Rule 23(f), the direct opposite of what the replica theory 
would have predicted. 
B. The Interest Group Theory 
Class actions have long been the source of heated controversy, in 
litigation and legislative conflicts so fierce they could be described in 
warlike terms.205  While the rhetoric surrounding the class action debates 
of the last few decades has often reached a fever pitch, it nonetheless 
cannot be denied that the rules governing when and how groups of 
plaintiffs may bring suit on a representative basis implicate social, 
political, and substantive policies like few other procedural rules.  The 
class certification determination itself is situated at the very heart of this 
debate: denying class status results in exponentially smaller individual 
stakes (or possibly abandonment of the suit altogether), while certifying 
a class may lead a defendant to settle even class claims it believes lack 
merit due to the threat of an enormous class damages award.206 
As a result of the tremendous potential consequences of that 
threshold decision, therefore, interest groups have attempted to influence 
the procedural rules relating to class action standards ever since the 
massive revamping of Federal Rule 23 was completed in 1966.207  One 
need not look hard to find that interest groups seeking to limit liability or 
                                                     
 205. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: 
Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 664 (1979) (“For more than 
a decade segments of the bench and bar have been waging a holy war over Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
 206. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 207. See generally HENSLER ET AL., supra note 7, 15–22  (describing early controversy and 
backlash against the Federal Rule 23 amendments of 1966, particularly related to Rule 23(b)(3) 
damages class actions). 
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restrict access to courts through tort reform are similarly invested in 
retracting the availability of class actions through rulemaking or 
legislative processes.208  The American Tort Reform Association 
(ATRA) developed its rankings of state “Judicial Hellholes” based in 
part on its desire to target plaintiff-friendly class action venues.209  The 
Chamber of Commerce includes class action reform on its list of 101 
ways to improve state courts,210 and regularly takes account of class 
actions in its yearly surveys ranking state liability systems.211  On the 
other side, the plaintiffs’ bar has inveighed against legislative and 
rulemaking efforts to restrict class actions.  One sees this not only in the 
plaintiff-oriented critics of Rule 23(f) itself,212 but also in the array of 
consumer and public interest groups that ardently opposed the passage of 
CAFA.213 
                                                     
 208. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They?  Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 858, 859 (1995) (colorfully explaining that “the class action has landed like a 600-
pound gorilla in the arena of tort reform”); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Effect of “Tort Reform” on 
Tort Case Filings, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 559, 582 (2009) (observing that “[t]he ‘tort reform’ 
movement has frequently targeted class actions”); Purcell, supra note 56, at 1904 n.330 (arguing that 
“[t]he hand of the “tort reform” movement was visible throughout CAFA’s course through 
Congress”). 
 209. See AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, supra note 115.  But see PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS 
WATCH, CLASS ACTION “JUDICIAL HELLHOLES”: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS LACKING 3 (2005) 
(critiquing the “paucity of evidence” to support ATRA’s claims about judicial hellhole jurisdictions, 
noting that ATRA identified only nine jurisdictions out of the 3,141 U.S. court systems). 
 210. See U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 48, at 20; see also Victor E. 
Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, & Leah Lorber, Tort Reform Past, Present and Future: Solving Old 
Problems and Dealing with “New Style” Litigation, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 237, 268 (2000) 
(urging tort reformers to think beyond “traditional” tort reform efforts, and identifying class actions 
as one of the most important tort reform goals of the future). 
 211. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2008 U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS RANKING STUDY (Table 11: Treatment of Class Action Suits 
and Mass Consolidation Suits) http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/index.php?option=com 
_ilr_harris_poll&year=2008&Itemid=18/.  The Chamber’s annual state survey methodology, based 
on interviews with in-house corporate counsel, has been the subject of formidable criticism.  See, 
e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad 
for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969, 970 (2009) (concluding that “[t]he survey lacks 
elementary social scientific objectivity and incorrectly characterizes state law”); Stephen J. Choi, 
Mitu Gulati, & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State High 
Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313, 1316–17 (2009) (observing that the Chamber’s 
rankings “reflect judgments of various individuals who do not necessarily have good judgment, 
express their views sincerely, or take account of all relevant considerations”); PUBLIC CITIZEN’S 
CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 209, at 4 (asserting that the survey’s results “should be approached 
with great caution as the respondents in the survey group have a clear bias”). 
 212. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 213. See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 209, at 2 (arguing that no 
empirical support justified “rewriting class action rules across the country that will dramatically 
reduce the legal rights of consumers and workers”); S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 82–83 n.4 (2005) (listing 
letters to Senate Judiciary Committee members in opposition to similar class action measures from, 
inter alia, National Association of Consumer Advocates, National Consumer Law Center, Public 
Citizen, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group). 
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This section explores the extent to which the influence of interest 
groups may help to explain why some states acted post-Rule 23(f) to 
amend their class action rules to increase appellate opportunities, and 
others did not.214  As neutral as federal rulemakers may have intended to 
be in promulgating Rule 23(f), and as non-partisan as the rationales for it 
may have been,215 the substantive effect of the amendment appears to 
favor defendants opposed to class certification.216  Certainly at the time, 
as the Advisory Committee well knew, federal appellate courts 
(including the Supreme Court) that did exercise appellate review usually 
applied more rigorous certification standards than district courts, and 
more often reversed than upheld controversial class certification 
decisions.217  And it cannot be denied that supporters and opponents of 
Rule 23(f) divided largely along interest group lines: defendant-oriented 
interest groups championed it, while plaintiff-oriented interest groups 
testified against it.218  The Interest Group Theory therefore suggests that 
a similar line-up might have engaged in parallel efforts for and against 
the expansion of appellate access for class litigants in the states. 
To test the Interest Group Theory, this section examines several 
possible measures of interest group incentives and opportunities to 
influence state rulemaking processes.  I begin with perhaps the most 
obvious evidence of interest group influence, the relative amenability of 
each state toward various tort reforms.  The Interest Group Theory would 
hypothesize that states that had proved to be highly receptive to tort 
reforms would also be more likely to engage in class action reform that 
provided an opportunity for tighter appellate scrutiny of class 
certification standards.219  Alternatively, I examine whether states 
                                                     
 214. Cf. Carrington, supra note 38, at 163 (observing that “legislative solutions to the problems 
of courts are prone to favor those factional interests that are best organized, thus reflecting the 
procedural preferences of those whom Marc Galanter has aptly described as ‘repeat players,’ [which] 
adds to the advantage already held by such litigants”). 
 215. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 216. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class 
Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521, 557 (1997) (arguing that the Advisory Committee’s endorsement of 
Rule 23(f) reflected its “necessarily substantive” desire to “reduc[e] the circumstances in which 
classes will be certified”); see also supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. 
 217. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997); In re Am. Med. Sys., 
Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1090 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th 
Cir. 1995); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 
779 (3rd Cir. 1995); see also Priest, supra note 216, at 558 (citing Rhone-Poulenc, General Motors, 
American Medical Systems, and the Third Circuit’s decision in Amchem as support for the contention 
that Rule 23(f) “will also enhance appellate authority to determine . . . whether the underlying claim 
of the purported class lacks substantive merit”). 
 218. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 219. See Priest, supra note 216, at 540 (“A purely procedural approach to class action reform, 
however, necessarily ignores the relationship between the class action and the substantive ends of 
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perceived to be hotbeds of class action activity prior to Rule 23(f) were 
more likely to amend their class appellate rules, a finding that also would 
be consistent with the Interest Group Theory.  Next, I explore the 
possible correlation between the number of Fortune 500 company 
headquarters in a state and its likelihood of adopting a state equivalent of 
Rule 23(f), hypothesizing that states with large numbers of such 
corporate headquarters would be more likely to experience defendant 
interest group pressure to adopt state class action appellate rules 
providing expanded opportunities to limit class actions.  Finally, given 
that class action appellate rules may be promulgated by a state’s supreme 
court, I consider whether a state’s method of selecting the members of its 
supreme court (by appointment or election) reveals potential interest 
group influence. 
1. State Tort Reform Adoption 
To examine the correlation, if any, between a state’s relative 
amenability to tort reform220 generally and its decision to amend its 
procedural rules to provide greater appellate access for class litigants, I 
looked to state tort reform data collected by Professor Ronen Avraham.  
The recently released third version of Professor Avraham’s Database of 
State Tort Law Reforms (DSTLR) represents the “most complete and 
comprehensive legal dataset” on tort reforms, including all fifty states 
and the District of Columbia.221  The DSTLR details decades of state 
activity regarding “the most prevalent tort reforms in the United 
States,”222 including laws related to joint and several liability, the 
collateral source rule,  split recovery, periodic payments, punitive 
                                                                                                                       
tort law.”). 
 220. I use the commonly invoked term “tort reform” to refer to laws seeking to limit liability 
and/or litigant access to courts, and do not intend to suggest that such so-called “reforms” actually 
reflect positive substantive advancements.  See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of 
the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 457 (2006). 
 221. Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (3rd), 2 (Apr. 2010), http:// 
sssn.com/abstract=902711. 
 222. Id. One limitation on using this database as a proxy for state interest in tort reform generally 
is that it focuses on reforms related to medical malpractice.  As Professor Avraham acknowledges in 
his introduction, while the DSTLR includes “general reforms and product liability related 
reforms[,] . . . the medical liability reforms are in general more complete and reliable.”  Id. at 9.  
While the DSTLR (3rd) remains by far the best empirical source for measuring state tort reform 
activity in 1998, the effective date of Federal Rule 23(f), it proved less helpful in correlating class 
action appellate rule changes with contemporaneous tort reform activity.  In a state like Colorado, 
for example, the DSTLR (3rd) reports no tort reform adoptions in the years immediately surrounding 
the date of its class action appellate rule change, despite documented tort reform measures enacted 
during that same 2003 legislative session.  This is not a failure of the DSTLR3rd data, but simply 
reveals the broad range of legislative activity that may be effectively viewed as tort reforms. 
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damages evidence, contingency fees, patient compensation funds, and 
caps on non-economic damages, punitive damages, and total damages. 
The Interest Group Theory suggests states that have already adopted 
rules limiting tort liability would also be likely to adopt rules that expand 
appellate access for class litigants, a particular policy goal of defendants.  
Therefore, one might expect to find a higher incidence of class appellate 
rule amendments among states that had already adopted the highest 
numbers of tort reforms.  Conversely, states without significant tort 
reform adoptions might represent plaintiff-friendly class action states 
more likely to be the targets of defendant-oriented interest groups 
seeking to achieve tort reform goals via class action procedural reforms 
(that might not be as controversial or high-profile as other tort reform 
efforts).223  On this view, one might expect to see a high percentage of 
class appellate rule changes among states that had previously adopted 
few tort reforms. 
Figure 10: States With Limited Interlocutory
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To test these hypotheses, I examined the status of state tort reform 
adoptions as of 1998, the year Rule 23(f) became effective.  No state had 
adopted all ten reforms included in the DSTLR, and no state had 
                                                     
 223. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
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declined to adopt any of the reforms.  On a scale of one to seven DSTLR 
tort reform adoptions, then, Figure 10 indicates the percentage of states 
that expanded appellate access for class litigants among those that did 
not already provide such expanded opportunities.  The highest 
percentage of amending states, 75%, can be found among states adopting 
only one tort reform as of that year, although there were only five states 
in that category.  The next group of states, which had adopted only two 
reforms, is consistent with what the Interest Theory would have 
predicted, the lowest percentage of states (17%) that subsequently 
amended class rules to expand appellate opportunities.  The percentage 
moves up to 25% for states that had adopted three tort reforms, climbs to 
43% for states that adopted four reforms, and then falls back down to 
33% of states that adopted five reforms.  At the top end of the scale, 
where the Interest Theory would have hypothesized a high level of class 
action appellate reform activity, 50% of states that had adopted either six 
or seven tort reforms subsequently amended their class appeals rules.  
That level exceeds that of any group of states other than those at the 
lowest end of the scale, as well as the overall average of all amending 
states (40%), but not to a particularly dramatic degree. 
Figure 11: Availability of Interlocutory Appeals, 
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Figure 11 looks at the pre-Rule 23(f) and post-Rule 23(f) percentage 
of states in each category that provided expanded class appeals.  The 
0 6 2_HINES FINAL.DOC 5/27/2010  9:26:06 AM 
1078 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
biggest increases in the percentages of states pre- and post-Rule 23(f) 
occurred at both extremes of the scale: while only 20% of the states that 
had only adopted one of tort reforms measured by Professor Avraham 
provided expanded appellate access pre-Rule 23(f), that number today 
has jumped to 80%.  At the top end of the scale, none of the states that 
had already adopted seven tort reforms previously allowed expanded 
class appeals, but today 50% do so.  Not only are the numbers at both 
ends quite small, however, but the percentage of states allowing 
expanded class appeals at the top end is actually smaller than the overall 
percentage of states today (61%), so it is difficult to count even those 
apparently notable increases as reliable indicators of an Interest Group 
effect. 
The rest of the Figure 11 underscores the dubious correlation 
between tort reform adoptions and likelihood of adopting this particular 
class action reform.  States that had adopted two tort reforms went from 
0% to17%, which would suggest that those states were unlikely to adopt 
either tort reform generally or expansion of class appeals.  But 42% to 
57% of the twenty-five states in the middle of the scale (which had 
adopted from three to five tort reforms) already provided expanded class 
appellate review pre-Rule 23(f), and now 57% to 72% do so.  In sum, the 
expected increases in amenability to this class action reform at the top of 
the tort reform adoption scale cannot be found in this data, and while 
some Interest Group effects may be happening at the lowest end of the 
scale we do not have sufficient data to support that hypothesis either.224 
2. Class Action “Hot States” 
The next measure of the Interest Group Theory examines the 
possible correlation between so-called “hot states,” those states that were 
perceived to be hotbeds of class action activity pre-Rule 23(f), and states 
that expanded class appellate rules post-Rule 23(f).  The Interest Group 
Theory would posit that defendant-oriented interest groups seeking to 
curtail class actions in such “hot states” might have attempted to exercise 
influence in those states more than in states not seen to be as willing to 
certify class actions. 
                                                     
 224. In future research, I hope to look more closely at the DSTLR (3rd) data and perhaps 
determine a methodology to capture additional evidence of state tort reform efforts.  The intriguing 
relationship between tort reform and class action reform, which I suspect to be quite significant, 
nonetheless cannot be supported with regard to the DSTLR (3rd) data standing alone. 
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While the hew and cry over such plaintiff-friendly state court class 
action certifications ultimately lead to the passage of CAFA,225 little 
empirical support for the proposition of pervasive rogue activity can 
readily be found.226  Detailed empirical studies documenting the actual 
number or nature of state court class actions227 not only did not exist at 
the time,228 they are still difficult to find for the vast majority of states.229 
Professor Deborah Hensler and others, however, working with the 
RAND Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ), did conduct extensive class action 
research in the late 1990s, examining, inter alia, the level of class action 
activity in the states.  The Hensler et al. study gauged such activity by 
reviewing multiple databases of both published judicial decisions and 
press reports of class action activity.230  As Hensler et al. acknowledged, 
this approach is far from perfect: “None of the databases provides a 
comprehensive report of all class action activity in the United States, and 
each reflects the preferences of its creators—reporters who choose to 
report only certain news, judicial opinion archivists who report only 
some decisions.”231  But this research nonetheless remains the most 
accurate available measure of state class action activity in the mid-1990s 
and certainly helps at least “paint a broad-brush picture of the class 
action landscape.”232 
                                                     
 225. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class 
Action Litigation: What Difference Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591, 599 (2006) (“Our 
data, however, lend little support to the view that state and federal courts differ greatly in how they 
resolve class actions.  For example, state and federal courts were equally unlikely to certify cases 
filed as class actions.”); see also supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 227. Cf., David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. 
L.R. 681, 684–85 (2007) (describing the benefits and accuracy of an “intensive study of trial court 
dockets,” which helps better “illuminate what the law’s rights and duties actually mean in practice”). 
 228. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 5. 
 229. See Hoffman et al., supra note 227, at 729 (acknowledging that state courts utilize 
electronic docketing far less often than federal courts, and that court dockets before 2003 remain 
largely unavailable today for either federal or state courts); see also supra note 47 and 
accompanying text (discussing lack of data for state court class actions).  Since 2002, the Chamber 
of Commerce has conducted annual surveys of corporate counsel regarding perceptions of state court 
class actions, see supra note 211, but the accuracy of these surveys in depicting actual class action 
practices in those states has been fiercely challenged.  See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 211, at 971 
(citing “demonstrable errors in the Chamber’s treatment of state law, with treatment of . . . class 
actions being especially problematical”). 
 230. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 52 (explaining detailed methodology). 
 231. Id.; see also Hoffman et al., supra note 227, at 727–28 (recommending “great caution in 
proceeding with quantitative analysis of legal opinions” because “[t]he underrepresentativeness of 
opinions is obvious and well known”). 
 232. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 52.  It must be noted that Hensler’s database included 
cases filed in both state and federal courts in each state.  The categorization of a state as a “hot” class 
action state, therefore, may have been affected by a relatively high number of federal court class 
actions in certain states.  Professor Hensler and her co-authors found that overall fifty-eight percent 
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The Hensler et al. study identified the states with the highest levels 
of class action activity from 1995-1997, a particularly useful period for 
examining any correlation between perceived “hot” class action states, as 
it falls just before the amendment of Federal Rule 23(f) and subsequent 
state adoption of expanded class action appellate rules.  Professor 
Hensler and her co-authors ranked such “hot” states by two measures: 
the total number of class action cases and the rate of class actions (the 
number relative to a state’s population).233  The study then reported the 
top five ranking states in each year and on each measure.234 
The Interest Group Theory would suggest that defendant-oriented 
interest groups might have sought to influence state class action appellate 
rules in states perceived as hotbeds of class action activity, on the 
assumption that increased opportunities for appellate review of class 
certification orders would help to regulate or deter class actions in those 
hot states.  The plaintiffs’ bar, on the other hand, assuming that rules 
limiting appellate review of class certification orders favored their 
clients,235 might have lobbied to protect their perceived procedural 
advantage in states that rejected the expansion of appellate access for 
class action defendants. 
To test the Interest Group Theory, I looked at whether the Hensler et 
al. study’s “hot” class action states were more or less likely than all other 
states (which I refer to as “non-hot” states) to have adopted procedural 
rules that expanded appellate review for class certification orders 
following the adoption of Federal Rule 23(f).  For the “hot state” 
categories shown in Figures 12 and 13, I created two separate lists of 
“hot” states. 
The first, “Hot States (Numbers),” includes the nine states that 
appeared on the Hensler et al. study’s top five rankings of states with the 
highest total number of class action cases, in either 1995-96 or 1996-97, 
with respect to reported judicial decisions or the general press, excluding 
                                                                                                                       
of class actions were filed in state court (as opposed to forty-two percent filed in federal court).  Id. 
at 56 (Figure 3.4).  Again, this is far from a perfect measure of state court class action activity, but 
even federal court class action activity in a state may have influenced a perception among interest 
groups in that state of the need to secure a higher level of appellate supervision of class actions in 
state court. 
 233. Id. at 58 (“We ordered states according to the number and rate (i.e., number per 100,000 
population) of class actions we found among reported judicial decisions and covered by the general 
press . . . .”); see also id. at 62–63 (Figures 3.9 & 3.10). 
 234. See id. at 58, 62–63. 
 235. Cf. PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 209, at 7 (noting that while several 
states “have amended their rules to allow interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions[,] 
[s]uch appeals are very harmful to plaintiffs with meritorious claims because it will delay the case 
[and] halt discovery”). 
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multiple listings for any state.236  I refer to the remaining forty states that 
did not appear on those top five rankings as “Non-Hot States 
(Numbers).”  Using the same methodology, I compiled a list of eight 
states that appeared on the Hensler et al. study’s top five rankings of 
states by total class action rate, which I refer in Figures 12 and 13 as 
“Hot States (Rate).”  The forty-one states that did not appear on any of 
the top five rankings list of states by rate of class action activity I refer to 
as “Non-Hot States (Rate).” 
Figure 12: States With Limited Interlocutory Appeals 


































 As seen in the left half of Figure 12, 67% of the “Hot States 
(Numbers)” amended to expand their class appellate rules following the 
amendment of Rule 23(f).  During this same time period, 38% of the 
“Non-Hot States (Numbers)” similarly adopted rules that increased class 
appellate opportunities.  More dramatically, as seen in the right half of 
Figure 12, amendment of class action appellate rules occurred in 80% of 
the “Hot States (Rate),” while similar amendment activity occurred in 
only 33% of the “Non-Hot States (Rate).”  One problem with this 
measure, however, is the small number of “hot” states, which may inflate 
the effect of any amendment activity among those states. 
                                                     
 236. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 7, at 62–63 (Figures 3.9 & 3.10). 
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Figure 13: Availability of Interlocutory Appeals, 



































Figure 13 examines the degree to which the apparent differences 
between hot and non-hot states highlighted in Figure 12 may be 
mitigated, at least in part, by the pre-Rule 23(f) level of expanded 
appellate access for class litigants in each category of states.237 To the 
contrary, the left half of Figure 13 shows that a far larger percentage of 
hot states than non-hot states, defined by total amount of class action 
activity, already had expanded access to interlocutory appeal of class 
certification orders: 67% of hot states had such appeals pre-Rule 23(f) 
while the same was true in only 27.5% of non-hot states.  Moreover, the 
resulting percentages for each category (measured by the total number of 
class action cases) reveal that today 89% of the Hensler et al. study’s hot 
states provide expanded appellate opportunities for class litigants, as 
opposed to 55% of the non-hot states.  The right half of Figure 13, 
showing hot and non-hot states by rate of class action activity, reveals a 
somewhat similar phenomenon, albeit less marked.  Pre-Rule 23(f), only 
a slightly larger percentage (37.5%) of hot states than non-hot states 
                                                     
 237. In other words, Figure 13 shows whether relatively more “Non-Hot States” than “Hot-
States,” by numbers or rate, already provided expanded class appellate rules before Rule 23(f) such 
that fewer non-hot states than hot states had incentives to amend. 
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(34%) offered expanded interlocutory class appeals.  Post-Rule 23(f), the 
percentages in each category vary more significantly, with 87.5% of hot 
states today providing expanded appellate access for class litigants as 
compared to 56% of non-hot states. 
In sum, there appears to be a significant correlation between the 
provision of expansive class interlocutory appeals and states identified in 
the Hensler et al. study as “hot states,” by either total number or rate of 
class action activity.  Hot states seem to have been more likely (in the 
case of hot states by total number of class actions, much more likely) to 
have had such preexisting class appeals than non-hot states.  And, hot 
states amended at markedly higher rates than non-hot states, leaving the 
current percentage of hot states with expanded appellate rights for class 
litigants just shy of 90% (by either number or rate measures) while the 
same is true only in 55–56% of non-hot states. 
3. Fortune 500 Corporate Headquarters 
States that are home to Fortune 500 corporations also make good 
candidates for identifying a potential Interest Group Theory effect.  First, 
one would expect states with relatively more large resident corporations 
to be more likely to respond to lobbying by corporate citizens for state 
laws favorable to their interests.  Second, particularly post-CAFA, in-
state corporations will often be denied the right to remove class actions 
brought against them to federal court, so one would expect such entities 
to be interested in promoting state court procedural rules they perceive to 
be strategically advantageous.238  The Interest Group Theory, then, would 
posit a correlation between the number of Fortune 500 companies in a 
state and that state’s likelihood of amending its class action rules.  
Consistent with that theory, one would expect to find a relatively higher 
percentage of states with high numbers of corporate headquarters 
providing expanded appellate access. 
To study this possible relationship, I used a ranking of Fortune 500 
corporate headquarters by state from Fortune Magazine in April of 
1998.239  I divided the 49 jurisdictions with class actions into 
approximate quintiles, although there are slightly more states in two of 
the quintiles because multiple states had the same number of corporate 
headquarters.240 
                                                     
 238. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Fortune 5 Hundred Ranked Within States, FORTUNE, April 27, 1998, at F-32. 
 240. Specifically, in the quintile of states with six to fifteen Fortune 500 headquarters, there were 
three states with fifteen headquarters and another three states with six headquarters.  Likewise, in the 
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Figure 14: States With Limited Interlocutory 
Appeals That Amended,
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Figure 14 does indeed show higher percentages of states amending 
class appellate rules in the top three quintiles, with 50% to 60% doing so 
compared to 17% to 37.5% in the bottom quintiles.  Given that 40% of 
states that previously limited appellate access amended overall during 
this period, the states with three to sixty-one Fortune 500 headquarters 
were relatively more likely than the overall average and the states with 
zero to two headquarters to amend.241 
                                                                                                                       
quintile of states with three to five Fortune 500 corporate headquarters, there were four states with 
five headquarters and four states with three headquarters.  While each of these quintiles contains 
eleven states, the other three quintiles each contains nine states. 
 241. While Figure 14 does not show a marked curve increasing from the lowest to the highest 
numbers of corporate headquarters, a threshold effect may be at play here rather than a linear 
relationship.  In other words, there may be a critical mass of Fortune 500 corporate headquarters 
located in a state that triggers sufficient interest group influence to effect change.  If there is such a 
threshold effect, then one would not find relatively greater degrees of interest group influence as the 
number of corporate headquarters increased, but rather (as Figures 16 and 17 appear instead to 
reveal) an increase at a threshold amount of headquarters and around that same percentage of change 
across the states with corporate headquarters that exceed that threshold amount, irrespective of the 
amount of headquarters exceeding the threshold. 
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Figure 15: Availability of Interlocutory Appeals, 
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Figure 15 presents the percentage of states in each quintile that 
permitted expanded appellate opportunities for class litigants pre-Rule 
23(f) and those that do so today.  Here, one can see a more significant 
rise in expansive class appellate rules as the number of Fortune 500 
headquarters in each state rises, and that upward curve is apparent both 
pre-Rule 23(f) and post-Rule 23(f).  The percentage of states with 
expanded appellate access increases pre-Rule 23(f) from 11% to 56% as 
one moves from lowest to highest concentrations of Fortune 500 
headquarters and from 44% to 78% along that axis post-Rule 23(f) (with 
a high of 82% in the second highest quintile).  Post-Rule 23(f), in other 
words, states with the least number of Fortune 500 headquarters provide 
expanded class appellate rules at a lower rate than the overall average 
(61%), while states in the middle range provide slightly higher than the 
average and a significantly higher than average percentages of states 
(78% to 82%) in the two highest quintiles, with six to sixty-one Fortune 
500 headquarters. 
These data are consistent with the Interest Group Theory, suggesting 
a correlation between a state’s number of Fortune 500 corporate 
headquarters and its likelihood of providing appellate access for class 
defendants: fewer states with low numbers of Fortune 500 headquarters 
permit expanded opportunities for appellate review, while relatively 
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more states do so when they are home to higher numbers of Fortune 500 
headquarters.  One complicating factor in this analysis is that the effect 
we see in Figure 15 may be explained by state population rather than the 
relative concentration of Fortune 500 corporations. 
To determine whether the Fortune 500 data largely reflect relative 
population density, I once again divided the states into quintiles242 for 
analysis using 1998 population data provided by the United States 
Census Bureau.243 
Figure 16: States With Limited Interlocutory 
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Figure 16 shows the percentage of states that amended class action 
appellate rules in the wake of Rule 23(f) for each of the five population 
quintiles.  The upward curve here is even more marked than in Figure 14 
(analyzing the percentage of amending states in each Fortune 500 
quintile).  The glaring exception to that pattern, however, can be seen in 
the first population quintile, which shows a 50% amendment rate among 
states with the smallest populations.  That amendment percentage, higher 
                                                     
 242. Here, however, I was able to break the forty-nine jurisdictions into four groups of ten and 
one group of nine. 
 243. See U.S. Census Bureau, State Population Estimates and Demographic Components of 
Population Change: July 1, 1998 to July 1, 1999, http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/ 1990s/ST-
99-01.txt (last visited April 22, 2010). 
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than the overall average of 40%, is higher than the next quintile of states 
and even slightly higher than the percentage of amending states in the 
third quintile. 













.46-1 1-2 2-4.3 4.6-8 8-32














Figure 17, which presents the pre- and post-Rule 23(f) percentage of 
states in each population quintile providing expanded class appellate 
rules, reveals a pattern similar to that seen in Figure 16 both before and 
after Rule 23(f).  Again, the marked staircase increases in percentages of 
states providing expanded class appellate access can be observed from 
the second through the fifth quintiles, with the lowest percentages of 
amending states found in the second quintile and the highest in the fifth.  
But, the first quintile of low population states breaks the pattern as it did 
in Figure 16, showing that 30% of states in that population quintile 
provided expanded appellate opportunities for class litigants even before 
Rule 23(f)244 and 66% of states did so post-Rule 23(f), again higher 
percentages than in either the second or the third quintiles. 
                                                     
 244. This pre-Rule 23(f) level of expanded class appeals undermines any replica theory 
explanation for these low population states, given that the federal rules did not allow expanded 
appeals before Rule 23(f).  One of these states, however, North Dakota, provided expanded appeals 
because of its adoption of a NCCUSL Model Class Action Act, evidencing a different kind of 
“replica” incentives but low-cost rulemaking all the same.  See supra notes 197–98. 
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The population data in Figure 16, then, reflects a fairly strong 
correlation between high populations and the likelihood of expanding 
class action appellate rules, with the exception of the relatively high 
percentage of amending states found among those states with the very 
lowest populations.  I believe that this latter phenomenon can best be 
explained not as seriously undermining evidence of the Interest Group 
Theory, but rather as evidence of the unrelated correlation, discussed 
supra, between low population states and their relatively higher 
likelihood of federal rule replication.245 
Does the population data undermine the Interest Group Theory 
explanation for state behavior?  I am inclined to think not, but rather that 
the presence of interest groups with sufficient stakes to influence state 
class action rules simply becomes more likely and more powerful among 
more highly populous states.  In other words, the Interest Group Theory 
effect may still be at play, but the number of Fortune 500 corporate 
headquarters is not the only (or perhaps even the most reliable) measure 
of interest group influences.  Highly populous states are simply more 
likely to have more interest groups with incentives to influence the 
rulemaking processes.246 
4. Method of Judicial Selection 
A final test for measuring possible Interest Group Theory 
explanations of state amendment activity is the manner in which states 
select their supreme court justices, given that rulemaking authority rests 
in many states at least in part (if not exclusively) in their supreme 
courts.247  Much has been written about one of the most important 
differences between federal and state courts—the phenomenon of elected 
                                                     
 245. See supra notes 163–65 and accompanying text. 
 246. One might even argue that the Interest Group Theory supports (at least in part) the high rate 
of amending states and the extent of expanded class appellate rules among states with the lowest 
populations.  On the one hand, one would have predicted that such states have insufficient 
populations (or corporate headquarters) to warrant the rulemaking influences of interest groups.  But 
on the other hand, interest groups in those states might more readily (or more cheaply) succeed in 
exerting pressures on rulemaking entities.  Interest groups might apply a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine which states to lobby, devoting greater resources to states with higher populations (and 
higher numbers of in-state corporate defendants) and fewer resources in states with relatively smaller 
populations, which explains much of what can be seen in Figures 16 and 17.  Interest groups might, 
however, also have rational incentives to lobby in states with the smallest populations because the 
relatively low costs associated with such efforts may be well worth the benefits to be gained. 
 247. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & Christopher C. Manthey, Public Process and State Judicial 
Rulemaking, 1 PACE L. REV. 121, 125–30 (1980) (discussing nature of state rulemaking procedures 
and the role of state legislative review). 
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rather than appointed judges.248  Unlike federal judges appointed with 
lifetime tenure,249 some commentators have argued, elected state judges 
likely will be far more attuned to the political implications of their 
actions.250  They may also be more vulnerable to the influence of interest 
groups who can either contribute to the judicial campaigns of favored 
justices or devote their resources to targeting disfavored justices for 
defeat.251 
In those states in which supreme court justices are elected, the 
Interest Group Theory would hypothesize that campaign contributions or 
political pressures result in a higher incidence of rulemaking activity 
favoring certain factions.  Such interest group pressure on state supreme 
court rulemakers might, therefore, help to explain which states adopted 
expansive interlocutory class action appellate rules.252  The Interest 
Group Theory suggests that a state with elected members of its supreme 
court would be more likely than a state with an appointed supreme court 
                                                     
 248. See, e.g., RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 11–13 (Matthew J. Streb ed. 2007); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court 
Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 158 (1999) (comparing the 
political constraints faced by federal judges appointed for life and state judges, some of whom secure 
their positions “in partisan elections that are every bit as competitive as those for local political 
office”). 
 249. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and 
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 801–02 (1990) (noting that while the federal 
rulemaking process may be “painfully slow, deliberative, and dull,” the federal judges that serve on 
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee “have little incentive to bend to political will”).  But see Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil  Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 
529, 613 (2001) (contending that the Advisory Committee has become increasingly subject to 
political pressures, “particularly [in its] receptiveness to certain arguments preferred by [defense-
oriented law and business] groups”); Macey, supra note 7, at 646 (observing that federal judges 
“have not captured the rule-making process completely,” as “other interest groups . . . inevitably 
influence the process”). 
 250. See, e.g., Tabarrok & Helland, supra note 248, at 157–62 (arguing that campaign 
contributions result in judicial bias and higher tort damage awards). 
 251. See, e.g., DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004 vi 
(Jesse Rutledge ed., 2004) (warning that “[a] perfect storm of hardball TV ads, millions in campaign 
contributions and bare-knuckled special interest politics is descending on a growing number of 
Supreme Court campaigns”); Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Participation in Judicial Elections, 
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 248, at 73, 80–83 (describing tort reform as the “principal 
motivating force” that is “driving the intensifying interest group involvement in judicial elections 
over the past three cycles”); cf. Melinda Gann Hall, State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: 
Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 317, 317–19 (2001) (concluding that 
judges in partisan elections are more likely to be defeated than those in nonpartisan or retention 
elections). 
 252. Cf. Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1391, 1397–98 (2001) (describing Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, and Alabama, which select their 
supreme court justices by partisan elections, as the sites of “hotly contested court battles having 
extensive interest group involvement”). 
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to adopt a class action appellate rule much desired by defendant 
corporations.253 
There are many limits to this measure of the Interest Group Theory.  
First, there may be little empirical evidence of a “link between political 
contributions and judicial behavior.”254  Second, a justice’s procedural 
rulemaking decisions are surely less likely than substantive rulings to 
motivate interest group pressures, even assuming that an elected justice 
may be influenced by interest group pressure at all.  Third, states that 
failed to adopt expansive class action appellate rules might have been 
motivated not by the inaction of defense-oriented interest groups but 
rather the more persuasive lobbying of plaintiff-oriented interest 
groups,255 so the absence of amendment activity might prove rather than 
disprove the theory but in ways that may be difficult to identify.  Finally, 
in a number of states, appellate rule amendment activity can take place in 
either the judicial branch or in the legislative branch.256  This 
phenomenon seriously complicates the task of attempting to detect 
whether political pressure by interest groups (if any) occurred more often 
in states with elected justices or occurred primarily in state legislatures, 
which renders a state’s method of state supreme court judicial selection 
                                                     
 253. Even states that appoint justices to their supreme courts on a facially merit-driven basis 
often include in their appointment processes either a state bar nominating committee or a legislative 
confirmation requirement, both of which may introduce similar interest group influences as found in 
states with elected justices.  See Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 
MO. L. REV. 751, 752–58 (2009) (examining “democratic” judicial selection methods that include 
senate confirmation, compared to more “elitist” selection processes allowing nominating influence 
by members of the state bar). 
 254. See Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfeld 
Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 612 (2008) (“It bears emphasis that empirical research has yet to 
explore systematically the relationship, if any, between class certification and the involvement in 
state judicial elections of interest groups—whether the local plaintiffs’ bar or business-side 
interests—for whom such rulings might well be a major topic of concern.”); see also Stephen J. 
Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case 
for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (Articles in Advance published 
online on Nov. 5, 2008) (casting empirical doubt on conventional wisdom that appointed judges 
exercise greater independence than elected judges).  But see Tabarrok & Helland, supra note 248, at 
157–62. 
 255. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, Tort Reform and Judicial Selection, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1483, 1488 (2004) (noting that in state judicial election battles, “trial lawyers and unions . . . tend to 
promote the candidacies of plaintiff-friendly judges”); Adam Liptak, The Worst Courts for 
Businesses? It’s a Matter of Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2007, at A10 (quoting a prominent class 
action plaintiffs’ attorney who referred to plaintiff-friendly venues as “‘magic jurisdictions’” where 
“‘the judiciary is elected with verdict money’”). 
 256. See, e.g., DONNA J. PUGH ET AL., JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: A COMPENDIUM V (1984); 
Parness & Manthey, supra note 247, at 128–30; Charles W. Grau, Who Rules the Courts? The Issue 
of Access to the Rulemaking Process, 62 JUDICATURE 428, 428 (1979); Allan Ashman, Measuring 
the Judicial Rule-Making Power, 59 JUDICATURE 215, 215–16 (1975). 
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far less significant as a predictive measure of the likelihood a state will 
adopt an expansive class action appellate rule.257 
To determine how the states select their supreme court justices, I 
reviewed data collected by the American Judicature Society.258  Figure 
18 presents three categories of judicial selection: appointment, non-
partisan election and partisan election.  The Interest Theory would 
suggest that states that select supreme court justices by partisan elections 
would be more likely than states with appointed supreme court justices to 
be influenced by interest group pressure to promulgate rules that favor 
those interest groups, such as expanded appellate access for class action 
defendants. 
                                                     
 257. One scholar has argued that judges who promulgate rules of procedure are also strongly 
motivated by their own “rational self-interest,” which usually includes—but sometimes conflicts 
with—rules that promote efficiency.  Macey, supra note 7, at 627.  The self-interest of state supreme 
court judges in adopting rules that expand appellate authority over class certification decisions, then, 
might include a desire to play a more prominent role in the development of this hotly contested area 
of law.  Cf. id. at 642–43 (noting federal appellate judges’ opposition to the creation of a new 
appellate court between the Supreme Court and existing courts of appeals because “reducing the 
caseload of the Supreme Court” would be achieved at the cost of reducing “the prestige of the lower 
federal courts of appeals”).  If that aspect of appellate court self-interest indeed exists, of course, it 
would presumably be present irrespective of the process by which members of a state’s supreme 
court are selected. 
 258. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE 
AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2010), http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents 
/Judicial_Selection_Charts_1196376173077.pdf (last visited March 24, 2010).  I looked only at the 
selection method for each state’s supreme court justices, rather than lower court judges, and I 
combined the data for all states that utilized various judicial appointment methodologies 
(gubernatorial or legislative appointment, selection through a bar nominating committee, etc.). 
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Figure 18: States With Limited Interlocutory 
Appeals That Amended,





























Apparently supportive of this Interest Group Theory hypothesis, 
Figure 18 shows that among states that elect their supreme court justices 
through partisan elections, 80% of states that previously limited class 
action appeals amended post-Rule 23(f) to expand class litigant appellate 
access.  This rate is significantly higher than either the 29% of states that 
select supreme court justices by non-partisan elections or the 35% of 
states that appoint members of their supreme courts.  Half of the states 
with partisan supreme court elections that amended their class appellate 
rules post-Rule 23(f), however, did so by legislative means rather than by 
judicial rulemaking.259 
                                                     
 259. Specifically, Alabama and Ohio enacted expanded class action appellate rules by statute 
while Illinois and New Mexico did so by Supreme Court rulemaking.  See supra notes 90, 97, 107, 
111 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 19: Availability of Interlocutory Appeal,






























Figure 19 reveals that pre-Rule 23(f), states with non-partisan elected 
supreme court justices were somewhat more likely than either of the 
other judicial selection categories to already provide expanded access to 
class litigants: 46% of states with non-partisan elected justices compared 
to 29% of states with appointed justices and 37.5% of partisan elected 
justices.  Post-Rule 23(f), however, 87.5% of states with partisan 
elections provided expanded class appellate rules, compared to 61.5% of 
states with non-partisan elections and 54% of states with appointed 
supreme courts. 
The numbers are small and, as cautioned above, it is quite difficult to 
single out this factor given several complicating factors: rulemaking 
authority shared between legislative and judicial branches, the potential 
for interest group pressure even among those states that appoint members 
of their Supreme Courts, and the potential for interest group pressures on 
both sides of the issue such that the absence of a rule expanding appellate 
access might mean either the presence of strong interest group opposition 
to such a rule or simply the absence of interest group influence 
altogether.  Indeed, the fact that half of the states with partisan elections 
that amended their class action rules did so by legislative rather than 
judicial rulemaking materially undercuts the apparent evidence of a 
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strong Interest Group Theory effect among states with partisan elected 
Supreme Court justices. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Rule 23(f) undoubtedly played a powerful role in state rulemaking 
decisions, as readily can be seen in the 40% of states that amended their 
limited class appeals rules post-Rule 23(f) to expand appellate 
opportunities.  But the data observed above suggest that those changes 
cannot solely be explained in terms of pure mirroring behavior, although 
some such replica effects likely took place.  The influence of affected 
interest groups muscling their way into state rulemaking processes 
appears in important part to explain the state changes that occurred, as 
well. 
As we saw in some of the anecdotal state evidence in Part III, 
influence group pressure to enact class action reforms such as this one 
may have been exercised as part of broader state tort reform efforts, 
although the best available state tort reform data does not appear to 
support such a correlation.  The high stakes world of class actions, 
however, clearly motivates both proponents and opponents of class 
actions to seek every possible strategic advantage.  Post-Rule 23(f), 
interest groups opposed to class actions had strong incentives to ensure 
that state class action rules at least provided discretionary appeals 
equivalent to Rule 23(f).  If a state’s class action rule limited a 
defendant’s ability to seek interlocutory appeal of a class certification 
order, class plaintiffs’ attorneys might elect to file in that state court 
forum rather than in an available federal forum.  Prior to CAFA, a 
defendant might have been unable to remove such an action to a federal 
court that provided greater access to appellate scrutiny of a certified 
class. 
Post-CAFA, of course, most multi-state class actions may be 
removed to federal court, but CAFA’s jurisdictional exceptions continue 
to provide enormous incentives for corporate defendants to lobby for 
class action appellate rules in their home states that at least provide 
discretionary appeals.  If such in-state corporate defendants cannot 
remove state court class actions due to CAFA’s jurisdictional carve-outs, 
they will therefore likely lobby for state class appellate rules that equal 
those they now have in federal court or push for even greater appellate 
access than that provided under federal Rule 23(f).  The data on Fortune 
500 corporate headquarters appear to bear out that hypothesis, as does 
the data on perceived class action “hot states”: in states in which 
corporate interest groups have greater incentives to pursue rules 
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providing greater opportunities to challenge class certification orders, we 
find higher rates of expanded appellate rules for class litigants.   
Rule 23(f) may have jump-started the phenomenon of state class 
action appellate rule changes, but interest group muscle appears to best 
explain much of that rulemaking behavior.  In states with little apparent 
class action activity or few large in-state corporations, the rule changes 
observed more likely reflect a continuing pattern of low-cost federal rule 
mirroring. 
